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Abstract
The thesis mainly reviews the mathematical analysis of the security of stream ciphers.
Firstly, we will introduce the background of stream ciphers with their design principles
and theoretical security from the information theory viewpoint. Then we will introduce the
algebraic tools for the analysis of linear recurring sequences followed by discussions on the
two kinds of basic nonlinear filters. Also, we will discuss the randomness of the sequences
over Fq and justify the use of linear complexity profiles to measure the randomness of the
key streams generated by linear feedback shift registers. An exploration of the probabilistic
properties of sequences over Fq is included too. Finally, we define an important parameter
k-error linear complexity to measure the security of the key streams and discuss the lower
bounds for this parameter of periodic sequences over Fq.
Chapter 1
Stream Ciphers and Their
Realizations
In this chapter, we will give a general picture of stream ciphers. Contents include their brief
history, basic principles and their theoretical background from the viewpoint of information
theory. In the end, we will introduce some realizations of stream ciphers published in the
open literature.
1.1 Introduction to Stream Ciphers
Beginning with a short summary of the development of stream ciphers in the past 50 years,
we will introduce the basic concepts and ideas of stream ciphers, including the design prin-
ciples, the synchronous and self-synchronous problems and how the key generators work.
1. The Brief History of Stream Ciphers
The birth of stream ciphers should be attributed to the invention of electronic communi-
cation technologies. At the end of the 19th century, several scientists such as Tesla and
Marconi contributed to the invention of “radio”, which was called “wireless telegraphy” at
that time. And after about 30 years of development, radio technologies became more ma-
ture and began to be used in the daily life of humans. The long distance communication
changed a lot compared to the 19th century because humans could use radio to deliver
electronic signals carrying messages instantly. In about 1920, radio was already widely
used in both military and commercial areas to exchange information.
Because the information was transmitted by electronic signals in the open air, everyone
1
Chapter 1: Stream Ciphers and Their Realizations 2
who had a receiver could get these signals and translate them to plaintext easily. So
it was not secure to deliver secret messages directly by radios. Then, the rotor-based
electromechanical encryption device was introduced and adopted all over the world (see
Shamir [33]) to solve this secret information exchange problem. However, memories in
these devices were quite expensive so that they only could have internal states being kept.
But as for the user data, the machine itself could not store them. It was cost that forced
the encryption being processed character by character.
In 1949, Shannon proved the perfect security of the Vernam one-time pad cipher in
his famous paper [36]. So from that time, it was known as the theoretically unbreakable
cryptosystem. The effect of Shannon’s paper in 1949 was that the support and popularity of
stream ciphers increased dramatically. In a long period since that time, almost all units in
the world, such as the military and diplomatic services, commercial and spy organizations,
and telecommunication providers, used stream ciphers to exchange their secret messages.
In the 1960s, transistor-based encryption devices were introduced. They were fast but
still had little memories. Computers also were invented and had applications in that time.
But they were more used in cryptanalysis than in cryptography. So steam ciphers, encrypt-
ing each character of the plaintext due to the unavailability of external memories, remained
popular. Another milestone of stream ciphers is the invention of the linear feedback shift
register. Then the stream ciphers could be precisely analyzed and controlled by mathemat-
ical theory. Lots of research was done in the following decades since LFSR was invented.
Also it could be implemented and computed easily and fast. Therefore, stream ciphers con-
tinued their popularity. Until now, most military and diplomatic organizations still keep
their tradition to use stream ciphers to exchange important and top secret intelligence,
despite the great popularity of block ciphers in modern commercial areas.
Nowadays, lots of research efforts are devoted to stream ciphers. Generally, they could
be divided into two parts. The first one is the research for military and diplomatic purposes.
Scholars serving for this purpose conduct their research, develop and analyze their stream
cipher cryptosystems without publishing results in the open literature. Although we have
no information about their research, we are sure of one thing: there are many cryptography
researchers supported by their nations’ special foundations and the departments of defence.
The second part is the open research. Besides lots of individual stream cipher cryptogra-
phers in universities and industrial companies, there are some research organizations that
attract worldwide top cryptographers to design new stream cipher cryptosystems, ana-
lyze their security, and contribute to their applications. A good example is the ECRYPT
Stream Ciphers Project. Recently, the demand for standardized stream ciphers increased.
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Figure 1.1: The basic two enciphering principles.
Therefore, stream ciphers will be a hot topic and attract lots of research attention in the
coming years. And we believe that in the near future, there will be some standardized
stream cipher that is widely used just as AES for block ciphers.
2. Basic Principles
Generally speaking, symmetric cryptosystems are divided into two types: block ciphers
and stream ciphers. Block ciphers operate an enciphering transformation on each “mes-
sage block” independently, for example every 64-bit string in DES. In contrast, stream
ciphers encipher each character of the message with a time-varying function to control its
internal state. The most obvious distinction between block and stream ciphers is “mem-
ory”, described by Figure 1.1 [32, Chapter 2].
A block cipher breaks the plaintext M = (m1,m2, . . . ,ml) into a number of message
blocks with the same length and transforms them to the ciphertext C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) via
an encryption function controlled by a secret key k. The encryption function is memoryless,
which means that the current ciphertext block depends only on the current input message
block and k. In fact, the encryption functions are permutations [3, Theorem 3.6.2]. On
the other hand, the stream cipher transforms each character of the plaintext mj to the
ciphertext cj with an encryption function having several internal memories, which implies
that the current jth state is decided by several previous states denoted by δj and the key
k. Since each enciphering step of the stream cipher is controlled by time-varying param-
eters, even two identical plaintext characters do not have the same ciphertext characters
in general. However, the encryption function of a block cipher may map two identical
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Figure 1.2: The basic working principle of stream cipher.
plaintext characters to the same objects. Therefore, the hackers may break some cipher-
text by comparing it with some ciphertext whose plaintext is already known. They also
could obtain some information about the plaintext by injecting, deleting, or replaying some
ciphertext. To avoid possible attacks against block ciphers caused by the above defect, the
block ciphers are usually implemented by encryption functions with additional memories,
such as electronic codebook mode, cipherblock chaining mode, cipher feedback mode, output
feedback mode, etc. For details, please refer to [3, Section 3.8].
The encryption function Ef(k,δj) used in stream ciphers is usually realized by a simple
operation: addition. For the convenience of implementation by hardware, the addition
is usually embedded in a field whose characteristic is 2. So one can easily see that the
encryption and decryption of stream ciphers are symmetric. The former works this way:
the cryptosystem generates a key stream by f(k, δj) for j = 1, 2, . . .. Here k is the secret
key and δj represents several previous states deciding the current jth state of the key
stream. Then each ciphertext character is given by cj = mj ⊕ f(k, δj). The procedure of
decryption is almost the same and the plaintext is obtained by mj = cj ⊕ f(k, δj). To get
a clearer picture of how it works, please see the Figure 1.2.
From the working procedures of stream ciphers, one can see that anyone having the
key stream could break the ciphertext easily because of the simplicity and symmetry of
its encryption and decryption functions. Therefore, for stream ciphers, the security of the
ciphertext relies on the secrecy of the key stream. So there are two basic requirements
on its security. The first one is that: from previous states of the key stream, one cannot
compute the next states of the key stream in a short time for practical purposes. Any
tools or methods used to predict the following states of the key stream are no better than
random guessing. Why do we require this property? This is because it is easy to obtain
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the old states of a key stream after they were used. Now suppose a key stream was used
to exchange intelligence in a local war. As the ciphertexts were transmitted in the public
communication channel, anyone would have them without any difficulty if he/she wanted.
Also some powerful men, or even ordinary people would get its corresponding plaintext
after a relatively short time, for example the secret military intelligence was released right
after the war. So these people could have the old states of the key stream just by adding
the ciphertext and plaintext. If from the previous states of the key stream, the hackers
could obtain some information about the key generator to guess the next states of the key
correctly with a high probability, then the stream ciphers obviously would be no longer
secure to exchange secret information in the future. That is why the first requirement
is imposed. The second requirement is that: the secret communication channel must be
perfectly secret, which means that only the two parties exchanging the secret information
have the secret key. Obviously, this is a universal requirement for all symmetric cryptosys-
tems. Cryptographers are usually more concerned about the first requirement. They try
their best to design fast and secure key stream generators, so that breaking the ciphertext
by usual cryptanalysis techniques is difficult and time consuming, especially for practical
purposes. Most successful breakings of the cipher, as history has shown, are due to the
violation of the second requirement caused by humans leaking secrets and bad administra-
tive procedures, especially in the key management domain [40, Chapter 2].
3. Synchronous and Self-Synchronous Stream Ciphers
The different ways to produce key streams specify two kinds of stream ciphers: synchronous
stream ciphers and self-synchronous stream ciphers. Differences between them come from
the parameters determining the current state of the key stream.
For synchronous stream ciphers, the current state is dependent on several previous key
stream states, but independent of the previous ciphertext characters. This implies that the
key stream generation is independent of the ciphertext transformation and can be carried
out separately both at the sender’s and the receiver’s ends. So when the Party A enciphers
a message using a synchronous stream cipher and sends the ciphertext to the receiver,
Party B, it must build a synchronization to guarantee the successful communication. More
exactly, when Party A sends the ciphertext character cj = mj ⊕ kj to Party B, Party B
must generate the corresponding key stream kj to obtain mj at the same time. If some
error happens during the transmission of cj, say it is lost or changed, Party A and Party
B must again set up their synchronization for communication.
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It is easy to imagine that the rebuilding of the synchronization involves quite complex
procedures. Whenever the synchronization is lost, the receiver, Party B, has two options
to deal with it. One is to search all the possible previous states of the key stream and
try to figure out the state at which the synchronization was lost, then compute the key
stream from that state. The other one is to contact the sender, Party A, then require the
sender to resend the ciphertext from some state where they could synchronize again. So
no matter which method is chosen, the resynchronization requires either lots of searching
and computation or a number of additional communication data.
However, this major disadvantage of synchronous stream ciphers is simultaneously a
defence against almost all active attacks on symmetric cryptosystems [32, Section 2.3].
Active attacks such as injection, deletion, replay of ciphertext, must lead to the loss of
synchronization. Therefore, the receiver and then the sender will be notified instantly that
there might be an active attack from a third party. If some hackers who could wiretap the
public communication channel change some characters of the ciphertext to simulate the
transmission errors caused by the communication channel, then either infrequent substitu-
tions will be corrected by the coding systems (nowadays, almost all the data transmission
hardware adopts the error-correcting coding systems), or too many substitutions will be
notified by the sender and receiver by the failure of transmissions, which is caused by the
number of errors exceeding the system’s tolerance. Therefore, these possible active attacks
on symmetric cryptosystems all fail when they are applied to synchronous stream ciphers.
Hence, we see a tradeoff between the security and the difficulty of synchronization. For
the sake of top security, it is worth the senders’ and the receivers’ great efforts to build the
synchronization between them.
As for the self-synchronous stream ciphers, the current state of the key stream is decided
by several previous characters of the ciphertext. Say the number of deciding characters
being n, and the key being k. The most common mode of self-synchronous stream ciphers
is cipher feedback mode. So with a key stream generating function f , each character of
key stream is given by: kj = f(k, cj−1, cj−2, . . . , cj−n). See Figure 1.3 to understand how it
works.
If a character of the ciphertext is lost or changed during the transmission, the error prop-
agates will forward to n characters in the key stream. Until another n correct ciphertext
characters are received, the sender and the receiver could re-establish the synchronization.
Compared to synchronous stream ciphers, the self-synchronous stream ciphers can be only
slightly immune to active attacks [32, Section 2.3], such as injection, deletion and replay
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Figure 1.3: The self-synchronous stream ciphers.
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Figure 1.4: The working principle of the key stream generator.
of the ciphertext, therefore their security level is somewhat lower. And since their key
streams depend on the plaintext, more exactly on the ciphertext, there is a big limit on
the analyzability of self-synchronous stream ciphers.
4. The Key Stream Generator
As one can see from the above discussion, the key stream generator is the core part in
a stream cipher cryptosystem. So the understanding of key stream generators’ working
principles is quite important. Generally, the key stream generator consists of one or several
finite state machine/s, for example, linear feedback shift register, and a nonlinear filter.
After initialization, the finite state machine f , controlled by the secret key k, is input a
current state δi and maps it to the next state δi+1 = f(k, δi). The nonlinear filter F maps
each state to an element ki = F (δi) in its embedded field and outputs it as a character of
the key stream. See Figure 1.4.
Since the outputs of every finite state machine are ultimately periodic (it will be proved
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in Chapter 3), any key stream generators could be implemented by Linear Feedback Shift
Registers (LFSRs) for the convenience of hardware. To achieve a high level of security, a
good nonlinear filter F is needed because LFSRs are linear devices and could be analyzed
easily. Therefore the design of good nonlinear filters has to satisfy several crucial require-
ments [32, Section 2.2] for the top security. Call the sequences generated by the finite state
machine the periodic driving sequences. Now we list these requirements:
1. F transfers the statistical properties of the periodic driving sequences to the key
stream.
2. F maximizes the period of the key stream compared to the periods of the driving
sequences.
3. F maximizes the linear complexity of the key stream.
4. F does not leak, which means that it is immune to modularizing attack.
5. F is easy to implement and can be computed fast.
6. F should easily be controlled by the key k.
Under known plaintext attacks, the security of stream ciphers relies on the key stream. So
the basic idea to design the keystream generator is making the key stream unpredictable.
The above requirements are necessary to guarantee the unpredictability. To get a more
concrete picture of the key generators and nonlinear filters, one could refer to the last
section in this chapter for some real examples and Chapter 2 for principles.
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1.2 Theoretical Security of One-Time Pad Ciphers
The popularity of stream ciphers in military and diplomatic organizations is due to the
perfect security of one-time pad ciphers. In fact, the core criterion of a secure key stream,
the unpredictability, is the main characteristic of one-time pad cipher’s key stream. After
understanding the mathematical fundamentals of the theoretical security of Vernam one-
time pad ciphers, one could clearly realize the design principles of stream ciphers.
1. Perfect Security
Let M, C,K, E ,D be the finite plaintext space, the finite ciphertext space, the finite key
space, the finite family of the encryption functions and the finite family of the decryption
functions, respectively. The encryption and decryption functions with key k are denoted
by Ek and Dk, respectively. Suppose M and K represent real-valued random variables on
M and K, respectively, and let PM : M → [0, 1], PC : C → [0, 1], PK : K → [0, 1] be
the probability maps. For the simplicity of notations, use Pm, Pc and Pk to represent the
probability of the plaintext M = m for m ∈ M , the ciphertext C = c for c ∈ C and the
probability of the key K = k in the key space k ∈ K, respectively. Use H(X) to denote
the entropy of the random variable X in the space X .
Definition 1.1 A symmetric cryptosystem (M, C,K, E ,D) is called perfectly secure (or
has perfect security) if H(M |C) = H(M) for every probability distribution PM .
Therefore from the definition, in a perfectly secure cryptosystem, knowing the cipher-
text distribution does not help to lower the uncertainty of the plaintext, i.e, observing the
ciphertext via a public communication channel does not help the hackers to derive any
information on the plaintext. This would be the ideal situation for the sender and receiver
since the only information hackers could get, the ciphertext, would not leak any informa-
tion about the perfectly secure cryptosystem. So the next task is to find some perfectly
secure cryptosystem.
Since we suppose M and C are both finite spaces, we can assume that Pmi > 0 and
Pcj > 0 for all mi ∈ M, cj ∈ C. By the definition of entropy, H(M) =
p∑
i=1
Pmi log2(
1
Pmi
).
Therefore for some cj, we have H(M |cj) =
q∑
i=1
Pmi|cj log2(
1
Pmi|cj
). Then, the conditional
entropy H(M |C) is defined to be the weighted average of the conditional uncertainty of M
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given that C = cj:
H(M |C) =
q∑
j=1
PcjH(M |cj) =
q∑
j=1
p∑
i=1
PcjPmi|cj log2(
1
Pmi|cj
) =
q∑
j=1
p∑
i=1
P(mi,cj) log2(
1
Pmi|cj
),
where P(mi,cj) represents the probability of mi being enciphered to cj. Since the joint en-
tropy is given by H(M,C) =
p∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
P(mi,cj) log2(
1
P(mi,cj)
) and P(mi,cj) = PcjPmi|cj , we have:
H(M,C) =
p∑
i=1
Pmi log2(
1
Pmi
) +
p∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
P(mi,cj) log2(
1
Pcj |mi
) = H(M) +H(C|M).
By the same argument, one could easily get H(M,C) = H(C) + H(M |C). Now, de-
fine the system mutual information I(M ;C) = H(M) − H(M |C). Then I(M ;C) =
H(M) +H(C)−H(M,C). Therefore, we have:
I(M ;C) =
p∑
i=1
Pmi log2(
1
Pmi
) +
q∑
j=1
Pcj log2(
1
Pcj
)−
p∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
P(mi,cj) log2(
1
P(mi,cj)
)
=
p∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
P(mi,cj)[log2 P(mi,cj) − log2 Pmi − log2 Pcj ]
=
p∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
P(mi,cj) log2[
P(mi,cj)
PmiPcj
].
By the Gibbs inequality, we have the I(M ;C) ≥ 0, and the equality holds only when
P(mi,cj) = PmiPcj for all i, j. This means that the cryptosystem is perfectly secure if and
only ifM and C are independent. So the probabilistic independence between the plaintext
and ciphertext is the core of perfect security.
2. The Perfect Security of the Vernam One-Time Pad Cipher
The famous cryptosystem Vernam one-time pad cipher was invented and patented in 1917
by Gilbert Vernam. But its perfect security was not proved until 1949 by Shannon in
[36]. Say the finite meaningful message space M consists of strings with length n and
each character is embedded in the binary field F2, then M is a subset of Fn2 . So is the
key space K and the ciphertext space C. The protocol of the Vernam one-time pad cipher is:
Input: A plaintext mi = (x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
n); a key kt = (k
t
1, k
t
2, . . . , k
t
n), whose bits are inde-
pendent and uniformly distributed.
Output: The corresponding ciphertext cj = (x
i
1 ⊕ kt1, xi2 ⊕ kt2, . . . , xin ⊕ ktn).
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Since each character of the key stream is independent and uniformly distributed, then
Pkt =
1
2n
and K = Fn2 . Then for any mi ∈ M, mi ⊕ K .= {mi ⊕ k, for all k ∈ K}
must be equal K, which means the ciphertext space C is equal to Fn2 . So for any mi, cj,
there is exactly one key kt such that cj = mi ⊕ kt. Moreover, M,K, C are all finite, so
Pmi > 0, Pcj > 0, Pkt > 0 for any mi ∈M, cj ∈ C, kt ∈ K.
Firstly P(mi,cj) = Pmi × 12n because the probability of the key k = mi ⊕ cj is 12n and
choosing this key is independent of the plaintext content. Although here we represent
the key k by cj, it is choosing the key first and then the ciphertext is decided. Next,
Pcj =
∑N
e=1 Pme × Pke , where me ⊕ ke = cj. Since we already know the existence and the
uniqueness of the key k such that c = m ⊕ k for any m ∈ M, c ∈ C, me must go through
all elements in M. Since Pke = 12n , we have that Pcj = 12n (
∑
e
Pme) =
1
2n
. Therefore,
P(mi,cj) = PmiPcj for all i, j, which means H(M) = H(M |C). Hence we have proved that
the Vernam one-time pad cipher is perfectly secure.
The perfect security of the Vernam one-time pad cipher relies on the key stream, a
sequence of independent and uniformly distributed bits. So simulating a “random looking”
sequence, whose bits are uniformly and independently distributed, is the main task of
stream cipher key generator design. But it is quite a hard mission. Firstly, there is
no definite mathematical definition of true randomness. The best situation is that we
could define pseudorandomness to serve some special purpose, which we will discuss in
Chapter 3. Secondly, any concrete algorithm must be deterministic, but the deterministic
procedures cannot produce truly independent outputs since any current procedure must
rely on previous procedures. Therefore, until now, no one could design a device to produce
a truly random sequence. Moreover, the keystream should be at least as long as the
plaintext and each key should be used only once (this is because repeatedly using a key k
will render the non-first-time encryption insecure under the known plaintext attacks and
replay attacks). Then the exchanging of the private key becomes difficult due to its big
data volume and costs a lot because of its one-time use. If the sender and the receiver
have an ideal secret channel to exchange the keys of the Vernam one-time pad cipher, then
would it not be a better idea to deliver the secret messages directly via this channel? So
we say the perfect security of the Vernam one-time pad cipher is theoretical. But this
ideal model informs cryptographers that they should try to simulate random sequences to
achieve perfect security. Now we are more aware of the criteria of the practical design of
stream ciphers:
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• The key, controlling the key stream generation, should be relatively short and easy
to transmit via a secret channel with low cost.
• The generated key stream should look random from the distribution and complexity
viewpoints.
• The algorithm to generate the key stream should be computed fast and implemented
easily.
To summarize, the perfect security of the Vernam one-time pad cipher makes the stream
ciphers using the same encryption method popular because if the key stream is “truly
random”, which means all the bits distribute uniformly and independently, then the stream
ciphers must be perfectly secure. However, the intrinsic drawbacks make the Vernam one-
time pad cipher unpractical. So these operational disadvantages led to the development
of the stream ciphers, especially synchronous stream ciphers. In the next section, we
will briefly introduce some good key generators of stream ciphers published in the open
literature.
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1.3 Practical Realizations of the Key Stream in Stream
Ciphers
In this section, we divide these key stream generators into two parts. The first kind of
key stream generators is given by the combinations of Linear Feedback Shift Registers and
some special nonlinear filters. LFSRs are easy to implement by hardware and fast to com-
pute. So they are widely used in the design of the key stream generators. Here we give
some concrete examples. Denote the ith LFSR and its jth state by < Li,Mi(x) > and xj,
respectively.
1. Knapsack Generator
In fact, this is a real implementation of the first kind of the nonlinear filters which will be
described in the following chapter.
Input: An LFSR < L,M(x) > with the initial state x0 = (x
0
1, x
0
2, . . . , x
0
L); modulus Q; L
knapsack weights w1, w2, . . . , wL of size n bits each.
Algorithm: For i = 1, 2, . . ., do
1. Compute the ith state of the LFSR xi.
2. Compute the knapsack sum Si =
L∑
k=1
xikwk mod Q.
3. Extract some bits of Si to be Zi.
Output: the sequence Zi, for i = 1, 2, . . ..
The security of the nonlinear filter, the knapsack sum, lies in the hardness of the knap-
sack problem. It is already known as an NP-complete problem [12]. For details on the
analysis of this generator, one can refer to [31].
2. Threshold Generator
Actually, this is a published proposal of a key stream generator, being an implementation
of the second type of the nonlinear filters which will be discussed later.
Input: n LFSRs < Li,Mi(x) > with initial states iI
0 = (iI
0
1 ,i I
0
2 , . . . ,i I
0
Li
).
Algorithm: For j = 1, 2, . . ., do
1. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, compute the jth state of each LFSR < Li,Mi(x) > and extract
iI
j
1 for each i.
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2. Compute the integer sum of the current output bits sj =
n∑
i=1
iI
j
1 .
3. zj = 1 if sj >
n
2
; zj = 0 otherwise.
Output: the sequence zj, for j = 1, 2, . . ..
This generator can have large linear complexity while it still maintains good statistical
properties [2]. Its algorithm is also very simple and fast. And z = {zj} will be balanced
when n is odd [40, Chapter 2]. But there is positive correlation between z and the n LFSRs
< Li,Mi(x) >, so it is cryptographically weak [40, Chapter 2].
3. Multiplexer Generator
Multiplexer generator, although it still belongs to the second kind of nonlinear filters, repre-
sents one kind of design ideas of key stream generators: technology-driven protocols. Some
algorithms are developed according to the availability of some hardware so they could be
implemented easily and conducted fast.
Input: Two LFSRs < L1,M1(x) >,< L2,M2(x) > with initial states x0,y0; a positive
integer n; a control vector v = (v0, v1, . . . , vn−1) such that 1 ≤ v0 < v1 < · · · < vn−1 ≤ L1.
Algorithm: For i = 1, 2, . . ., do
1. Compute the ith state of each LFSR< L1,M1(x) >,< L2,M2(x) >, xi = (x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
L1
),
and yi = (y
i
1, y
i
2, . . . , y
i
L2
) .
2. Compute the integer ai =
n−1∑
k=0
2kxivk .
3. Extract zi = y
i
θ(ai)
, where θ is an invertible mapping from {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1} to
{1, 2, . . . , L2}.
Output: the sequence zi, for i = 1, 2, . . ..
This generator is due to the invention of the multiplexer circuit. Detailed analysis can
be found in Jennings [13], [14]. Besides multiplexer generator, Pless generator is also an
example which was developed after the availability of the hardware, J-K flip-flop circuits.
The second kind of key stream generators does not employ LFSRs. Their design ideas
originate from number theory and well-known hard problems, such as discrete logarithm,
quadratic residue, etc.. The security of most generators is built on computational complex-
ity. So ideas of these generators are classified under the complexity-theoretic approach [40,
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Chapter 2]. Let us introduce a concrete generator as an example.
4. Quadratic Residue Generator
As is well known, given y ∈ Z, it is in general hard to find x ∈ Z such that the congruence
y = x2 mod N is satisfied. If there exists such x, then y is called a quadratic residue
mod N . Denote by QRN the set of all quadratic residues mod N .
Input: A modulus N of length n; x1 ∈ QRN which is chosen randomly.
Algorithm: For i = 1, 2, . . ., do
1. zi = xi mod 2, zi ∈ {0, 1}
2. xi+1 = x
2
i mod N
Output: the sequence zi, for i = 1, 2, . . ..
The security of the quadratic residue generator relies on the difficulty of solving quadratic
congruences. In [40, Chapter 2], under the quadratic residuosity assumption, the gener-
ating key stream {zi} is proved to be unpredictable, which means the probability of any
predictor to predict each key bit successfully is less than
1
2
, and indistinguishable by all
polynomial-time statistical tests. So the quadratic residue generator is called perfect.
Chapter 2
Linear Recurring Sequences and
Linear Complexity
In the 1950s, Linear Feedback Shift Registers were introduced into stream cipher appli-
cation. In the following decades, since they are easy to implement by hardware and fast
to process, LFSRs were often recommended to be the pseudorandom sequences genera-
tors. And what is more important is that because of the adoption of LFSRs in stream
ciphers, cryptographers and mathematicians could use rigorous mathematical theory to
analyze their security. Also because LFSRs are linear devices, the linear complexity is a
vital concept to determine the security levels of stream ciphers (for other complexity mea-
surements such as higher-order complexity, 2-adic complexity measures and complexity
measures based on pattern counting, one could refer to [27]). And the linear complexity
profile is also a good tool to measure the randomness of generated sequences which is
discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, in this chapter, we will give the detailed theoretical
analysis of Linear Recurring Sequences and their linear complexities.
2.1 Introduction and Mathematical Fundamentals
In this section, we will introduce some concepts and algebraic tools which will be employed
later. There are lots of excellent references on the finite field algebraic structures. One may
refer to [18] for basic background and exciting results. Firstly, some important definitions
should be given. From now on, let Fq be the finite field of order q, where q is an arbitrary
prime power.
16
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Figure 2.1: The General Form of Feedback Shift Register.
Definition 2.1: Let k be a positive integer, and ai ∈ Fq for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1. Then call a
sequence s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) of elements in Fq satisfying
sn+k = a1sn+k−1 + a2sn+k−2 + · · ·+ aksn + ak+1 for n = 1, 2, . . . (2.1)
a kth-order linear recurring sequence in Fq. The terms s1, s2, . . . , sk are called initial
values. If ak+1 = 0, we call (2.1) homogeneous and s˜ a homogeneous linear recur-
ring sequence. Otherwise, (2.1) and s˜ are called inhomogeneous and inhomogeneous
linear recurring sequence, respectively.
Linear recurring sequences usually are generated by a feedback shift register. It is a kind
of electronic switching circuit consisting of four basic types. The first one is an adder with
two inputs a, b ∈ Fq and one output a
⊕
b ∈ Fq; the second one is a constant k multiplier
with an input a ∈ Fq and an output ka ∈ Fq; the third one is a constant k adder with an
input a and an output a
⊕
k ∈ Fq; the last one is a delay element D with an input and an
output controlled by a time parameter such that the output is one time unit later than the
input. A general form of a feedback shift register for (2.1) is given by Figure 2.1 (a = ak+1).
Definition 2.2: Call s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) ultimately periodic if there are positive
integers n0 and T such that sn+T = sn for all n ≥ n0. The number T is called a period of
s˜. If n0 = 1, then s˜ is called periodic. The smallest T is called the minimal period.
Let us consider the homogeneous linear recurring sequences in Fq satisfying the linear
recurrence relation
sn+k = a1sn+k−1 + a2sn+k−2 + · · ·+ aksn for n = 1, 2, . . . , (2.2)
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where ai ∈ Fq for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now we introduce some crucial definitions in the analysis of
homogeneous linear recurring sequences.
Definition 2.3: The characteristic polynomial fs˜(x) of the linear recurring sequence
s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) satisfying (2.2) is defined by
fs˜(x) = x
k − a1xk−1 − a2xk−2 − · · · − ak−1x− ak ∈ Fq[x]. (2.3)
And its reciprocal characteristic polynomial f ∗s˜ (x) is given by
f ∗s˜ (x) = x
kf(
1
x
) = 1− a1x1 − a2x2 − · · · − ak−1xk−1 − akxk ∈ Fq[x]. (2.4)
Set ss˜(x) = s1x
T−1+s2xT−2+· · ·+sT−1x+sT and a0 = −1. Then a very important relation-
ship between a homogeneous linear recurring sequence with period T and its characteristic
polynomial is given by the following identity [18, Section 6.2]:
fs˜(x)ss˜(x) = (1− xT )hs˜(x), (2.5)
where hs˜(x) is given by
hs˜(x) =
k−1∑
j=0
k−j∑
i=1
ak−i−jsixj ∈ Fq[x]. (2.6)
There is also another very interesting connection between si and the roots of the character-
istic polynomial of s˜, when it is irreducible over Fq. Suppose s˜ is a kth order homogeneous
linear recurring sequence in Fq and fs˜(x) is irreducible. Let α be a root of fs˜(x) in the
extension field Fqk , then there exists a unique θ ∈ Fqk such that
si = TrF
qk
/Fq(θα
i) = θα + (θαi)q + (θαi)q
2
+ · · ·+ (θαi)qk−1 for i = 1, 2, . . . . (2.7)
Definition 2.4: A nonzero homogeneous linear recurring sequence over Fq whose char-
acteristic polynomial is a primitive polynomial over Fq is called a maximal period se-
quence.
An immediate conclusion following Definition 2.4 is that a kth order maximal period
sequence is periodic and its minimal period achieves the largest possible value qk − 1 [18,
Section 6.2].
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Definition 2.5: Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) be a homogeneous linear recurring sequence
in Fq and L be the set of all linear recurrence relations which can generate s˜. Then the
characteristic polynomial of the minimal linear recurrence relation which has the small-
est order in L is called the minimal polynomial of s˜. And the smallest order, which is
the same as the degree of the minimal polynomial of s˜, is called the linear complexity of s˜.
Definition 2.6: Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) over Fq. Then its generating function is
defined to be a formal power series with an indeterminate x given by
Gs˜(x) = s1 + s2x+ s3x
2 + · · ·+ snxn−1 + · · · =
∞∑
i=1
six
i−1 ∈ Fq[[x]]. (2.8)
For a finite sequence s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) over Fq, we assign zeros to be the terms after n.
The algebraic computations of these formal power series involve addition and multi-
plication. Suppose B(x) =
∞∑
i=1
bix
i−1 and C(x) =
∞∑
j=1
cjx
j−1, then their sum is defined
by
B(x) + C(x) =
∞∑
n=1
(bn + cn)x
n−1
and their multiplication is given by
B(x)C(x) =
∞∑
n=1
dnx
n−1, where dn =
n∑
k=1
bkcn+1−k for n = 1, 2, . . . .
Based on the above definitions, we have [B(x)C(x)]D(x) = B(x)[C(x)D(x)] andB(x)[C(x)+
D(x)] = B(x)C(x) +B(x)D(x). Moreover, the formal power series B(x) =
∞∑
i=1
bix
i−1 has a
multiplicative inverse if and only if b1 6= 0 [18, Section 6.3]. Now we are ready to introduce
some strong tools to analyze the linear recurring sequences.
Theorem 2.1: Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) be a kth order homogeneous linear recurring
sequence in Fq, whose linear recurrence relation is given by (2.2). Suppose f ∗s˜ (x) ∈ Fq[x]
is the reciprocal characteristic polynomial of s˜, and let Gs˜(x) ∈ Fq[[x]] be its generating
function. Set a0 = −1. Then there is a gs˜(x) ∈ Fq[x] such that
Gs˜(x) =
gs˜(x)
f ∗s˜ (x)
, where gs˜(x) = −
k−1∑
j=0
(
j+1∑
i=1
aj+1−isi)xj. (2.9)
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Conversely, if g(x) is any polynomial over Fq with deg(g(x)) < k and if f ∗(x) is equal to
(2.4), then the formal power series G(x) ∈ Fq[[x]] defined by G(x) = g(x)
f ∗(x)
is the gen-
erating function of a kth order homogeneous linear recurring sequence in Fq whose linear
recurrence relation is given by (2.2).
Proof: Firstly let us consider the first part of this theorem. We have
f ∗s˜ (x)Gs˜(x) = −
( k∑
n=0
anx
n
)( ∞∑
n=1
snx
n−1
)
= −
k−1∑
j=0
( j+1∑
i=1
aj+1−isi
)
xj −
∞∑
j=k
( k+1∑
i=1
ak+1−isj−k+i
)
xj
= gs˜(x)−
∞∑
j=k
( k+1∑
i=1
ak+1−isj−k+i
)
xj. (2.10)
From (2.2), we have sj+1 =
k∑
i=1
aisj+1−i, which implies
k+1∑
i=1
ak+1−isj−k+i = 0. Therefore,
given f ∗(0) = 1, the identity (2.9) holds.
Then, consider the second part of this theorem. Since G(x) =
g(x)
f ∗(x)
, we have g(x) =
f ∗(x)Gs˜(x). Therefore, the fact deg(g(x)) < k forces
k+1∑
i=1
ak+1−isj−k+i = 0, which implies
sj+1 =
k∑
i=1
aisj+1−i for all j ≥ k. Hence, s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) whose generating polyno-
mial is G(x) satisfies the linear recurrence relation (2.2). 2
Remark: Here we have a relation between gs˜(x) and hs˜(x) defined in (2.6), which is given
by xk−1gs˜(
1
x
) = −hs˜(x).
Theorem 2.2: Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) be a homogeneous linear recurring sequence over
Fq. Then there exists a unique polynomial ms˜(x) such that it is the minimal polynomial of
s˜ and a monic polynomial f(x) ∈ Fq[x] with positive degree is a characteristic polynomial
of s˜ if and only if ms˜(x) | f(x).
Proof: Since every homogeneous linear recurring sequence over Fq is ultimately periodic,
we can suppose the period of s˜ is T . Now let fs˜(x) be the characteristic polynomial of s˜,
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hs˜(x) be given by (2.6) and gs˜(x) be defined as in (2.9). Suppose d(x) = gcd(fs˜(x), hs˜(x))
to be monic, then define ms˜(x) =
fs˜(x)
d(x)
. Obviously, ms˜(x) is monic.
Now let f(x) ∈ Fq[x] be an arbitrary characteristic polynomial of s˜. And let h(x) and
g(x) be its corresponding polynomials defined by (2.6) and (2.9) given the linear recurrence
relation of s˜ defined by f(x). Therefore according to Theorem 2.1, we have
Gs˜(x) =
gs˜(x)
f ∗s˜ (x)
=
g(x)
f ∗(x)
.
Hence g(x)f ∗s˜ (x) = gs˜(x)f
∗(x). By the remark after Theorem 2.1,
h(x)fs˜(x) = −xdeg[f(x)]−1g( 1
x
)xdeg[fs˜(x)]f ∗s˜ (
1
x
) = −xdeg[fs˜(x)−1]gs˜( 1
x
)xdeg[f(x)]f ∗(
1
x
) = hs˜(x)f(x).
Now divide d(x) on both sides of h(x)fs˜(x) = hs˜(x)f(x), then we have h(x)ms˜(x) =
hs˜(x)
d(x)
f(x), which forces ms˜(x) | f(x) by the definition of d(x).
Now suppose f(x) ∈ Fq is a monic polynomial and f(x) = ms˜(x)r(x). Then f ∗(x) =
m∗s˜(x)r
∗(x). Let R(x) =
hs˜(x)
d(x)
. Hence, by hs˜(x)ms˜(x) = R(x)fs˜(x), we have
gs˜(x)m
∗
s˜(x) = −xdeg[fs˜(x)]−1hs˜(
1
x
)xdeg[ms˜(x)]ms˜(
1
x
) = −xdeg[ms˜(x)]−1R( 1
x
)xdeg[fs˜(x)]fs˜(
1
x
).
Since deg[R(x)] < deg[ms˜(x)], t(x) = −xdeg[ms˜(x)]−1R( 1
x
) is a polynomial in Fq[x]. By
gs˜(x)m
∗
s˜(x) = t(x)f
∗
s˜ (x),
Gs˜(x) =
gs˜(x)
f ∗s˜ (x)
=
t(x)
m∗s˜(x)
=
t(x)r∗(x)
f ∗(x)
.
Because deg[t(x)r∗(x)] = deg[t(x)]+deg[r∗(x)] < deg[ms˜(x)]+deg[r(x)] = deg[f(x)], from
Theorem 2.1, we conclude that f(x) is a characteristic polynomial of s˜.
Suppose Ms˜(x) is the minimal polynomial of s˜. We have ms˜(x) |Ms˜(x). But according
to the definition of the minimal polynomial, we get deg[Ms˜(x)] ≤ deg[ms˜(x)], then we have
ms˜(x) = Ms˜(x) is the minimal polynomial. Suppose there is another minimal polynomial
m(x) of s˜. Then given both are monic, ms˜(x) | m(x) and m(x) | ms˜(x) imply the unique-
ness. 2
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Definition 2.7 Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) be a finite sequence over Fq. Denote the linear
complexity of the first i terms (s1, s2, . . . , si) by L(s˜
i). Then the linear complexity pro-
file of s˜ is defined to be the sequence (L(s˜1), L(s˜2), . . . , L(s˜n)). For an infinite sequence
s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .), its linear complexity profile is defined to be the corresponding infi-
nite sequence (L(s˜1), L(s˜2), . . . , L(s˜i), . . .).
According to the discussion of Chapter 3, the linear complexity and the linear complex-
ity profile of a sequence s˜ are two vital characteristic parameters to measure its security
when it is used as the key stream. Therefore, we will introduce two methods to compute
the linear complexity profile of s˜ next. The first one is called Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
invented by J. L. Massey [20] in 1969, which is based on the iterative algorithm first intro-
duced by Berlekamp for decoding BCH codes.
Now let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) over Fq, s˜n = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and the linear complexity
of s˜n be denoted by L(s˜n). Suppose f ∗s˜n(x) = 1 − an1x − an2x2 − · · · − anL(s˜n)xL(s˜
n) ∈ Fq[x]
to be the reciprocal characteristic polynomial of s˜n. The basic idea of the Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm is that: if for some m such that sn+m−1 =
L(s˜n)∑
i=1
ani sn+m−1−i but sn+m 6=
L(s˜n)∑
i=1
ani sn+m−i, then we have
L(s˜n+m) = max(L(s˜n), n+m− L(s˜n)), (2.11)
and the new reciprocal characteristic polynomial of s˜n+m is given by
f ∗s˜n+m(x) = f
∗
s˜n(x)−
sn+m − (
L(s˜n)∑
i=1
ani sn+m−i)
st − (
t−L(s˜n)∑
i=1
atist−i)
xn+m−tf ∗s˜t−1(x), (2.12)
where t is the positive integer such that L(s˜t−1) < L(s˜t) = L(s˜n).
Berlekamp-Massey Algorithm:
Input: s˜n = (s1, s2, . . . , sn).
1. Initialization: f ∗(x) := 1, B(x) := 1, r := 1, L := 0, b := 1, i := 1.
2. For i=1:n, do
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• Compute d = si −
L∑
j=1
ajsi−j.
Here if L = 0, let
L∑
j=1
ajsi−j = 0; If L = 1, i = 1, let
L∑
j=1
ajsi−j = 0.
• If d = 0, then let r := r + 1 and i := i+ 1.
• If d 6= 0 and 2L ≤ i, then let
T (x) := f ∗(x);
f ∗(x) := f ∗(x)− db−1xrB(x);
L := i+ 1− L;B(x) := T (x);
b := d, r := 1;
i := i+ 1;
3. Return L.
Output: L(s˜n) = L.
The second method to determine the linear complexity of s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) is
given by the continued fraction expansion of G˜s˜(x) =
∞∑
i=1
si
(1
x
)i
. This method was first
introduced by Harald Niederreiter in [26]. We summarize it here. Firstly, let D = Fq[[
1
x
]].
Then for every g ∈ D, there is a unique continued fraction expansion of g given by
g = A0 + 1/(A1 + 1/(A2 + · · · )) := [A0, A1, A2, . . .], (2.13)
where Ai ∈ Fq[x] for all i ≥ 0 and deg(Ai) ≥ 1 for all i ≥ 1. For S =
∞∑
i=r
six
−i ∈ Fq[[ 1
x
]],
define its polynomial part by
Pol(S) =
0∑
i=r
six
−i.
Now suppose s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) is in Fq, s˜n = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and G˜s˜ =
∞∑
i=1
si
(1
x
)i
. Set
A0 = Pol(G˜s˜), B0 = G˜s˜ − Pol(G˜s˜), P−1 = 1, P0 = A0, Q−1 = 0, Q0 = 1. Now define Aj,
Bj, Pj, Qj recursively by
Aj+1 = Pol(B
−1
j ), Bj+1 = B
−1
j − Pol(B−1j ) for j ≥ 0,
Pj = AjPj−1 + Pj−2, Qj = AjQj−1 +Qj−2 for j ≥ 1.
Then, the linear complexity L(s˜n) is given by L(s˜n) = deg(Qj), where j ≥ 0 is uniquely
determined by
deg(Qj−1) + deg(Qj) ≤ n < deg(Qj) + deg(Qj+1).
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One can refer to [26] for the rigorous proof.
Besides these two algorithms, we will consider another way to find the linear complexity
of periodic sequences. This is very important for the discussion in Chapter 4.
Theorem 2.3: Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) be a periodic sequence over Fq with the minimal
period T . Let gs˜(x) = s1 + s2x + · · · + sTxT−1 and D(x) = gcd(gs˜(x), 1 − xT ). Then its
linear complexity L(s˜) is given by L(s˜) = deg
(1− xT
D(x)
)
.
Proof: Let Gs˜(x) be the generating function of s˜. Since sn+T = sn for all n ≥ 1 and the
constant term of 1− xT is nonzero, we have
Gs˜(x) =
gs˜(x)
1− xT .
From the proof of Theorem 2.2, we know that the minimal polynomial ms˜(x) of s˜ is given
by
fs˜(x)
gcd(fs˜(x), hs˜(x))
, where hs˜(x) is defined as in (2.6). Since s˜ is periodic with the minimal
period T , its characteristic polynomial is given by fs˜(x) = x
T − 1. After computation, we
have hs˜(x) = −xT−1gs˜( 1
x
) and gs˜(x) = −xT−1hs˜( 1
x
). Suppose xT − 1 = d(x)a(x) and
hs˜(x) = d(x)b(x), where d(x) = gcd(x
T − 1, hs˜(x)). Then by the remark after Theorem
2.1, we have gs˜(x) = −xT−1d( 1
x
)b(
1
x
). Obviously, we have ms˜(x) = a(x), a(0) 6= 0 and
L(s˜) = T − deg(d(x)). Now consider
s˜m(x)
.
=
1− xT
gcd(1− xT , gs˜(x)) =
−d(x)a(x)
gcd(−d(x)a(x),−xT−1d( 1
x
)b(
1
x
))
=
xTd(
1
x
)a(
1
x
)
gcd
(
xTd(
1
x
)a(
1
x
),−xT−1d( 1
x
)b(
1
x
)
)
=
xdeg(a(x))a(
1
x
)
gcd
(
xdeg(a(x))a(
1
x
),−xdeg(a(x))−1b( 1
x
)
) .
For any irreducible polynomial p(x) ∈ Fq[x] with degree m ≥ 2, we have
p(x) =
m−1∏
i=0
(x− θqi), where p(θ) = 0.
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Then,
p∗(x) = xmp(
1
x
) =
m−1∏
i=0
(−θqi)
m−1∏
j=0
(x− (1
θ
)q
j
).
Since gcd(qm − 1, qm − 2) = 1, then 1
θ
= θq
m−2 is still a defining element of Fqm , which
implies p∗(x) is also irreducible. If m = 1, the conclusion holds obviously. Now, factoring
a(x), b(x) to canonical forms, we conclude that gcd(a∗(x), b∗(x)) = 1. Because a∗(0) 6= 1
and deg(b(x)) < deg(a(x)), s˜m(x) must be equal to a
∗(x) = xdeg(a(x))a(
1
x
). Therefore
deg(s˜m(x)) = deg(a
∗(x)) = deg(a(x)) = T − deg(d(x)) = L(s˜). 2
Now according to Theorem 2.3, we can just find the minimal polynomial of a periodic
sequence s˜ directly from 1− xT and the corresponding polynomial of its first minimal pe-
riod terms by computing their greatest common divisor.
Proposition 2.1: Let s˜ be a periodic sequence over Fq with period T and Gs˜(x) be
its generating function. Suppose ms˜(x) is the minimal polynomial of s˜ and gs˜(x) =
s1 + s2x+ · · ·+ sTxT−1. Then ms˜(x) = E∗(x), where E(x) = 1− x
T
gcd(gs˜(x), 1− xT ) .
Proof: Directly from the proof of Theorem 2.3. 2
Remark: Notice that if a(x), b(x) ∈ Fq[x] such that a(0)b(0) 6= 0, then (a∗)∗(x) = a(x)
and so does b(x). Therefore, a(x) | b(x) if and only if a∗(x) | b∗(x). Consider the minimal
polynomial of periodic sequences. By Proposition 2.1, they do not contain factors xi. So
according to the above discussion, any properties of the minimal polynomial can be trans-
ferred to its reciprocal polynomial (this means we can also define E(x) in Proposition 2.1
to be the minimal polynomial by replacing the Definition 2.5, if our discussion is confined
to periodic sequences). This conclusion is important to the remaining content in this chap-
ter and Chapter 4. In the following sections, sometimes we will derive the degrees of the
minimal polynomials of periodic sequences directly from (2.9).
For the linear complexity of special sequences of cryptologic interests, a lot of research
has been done by various authors. In Caballero-Gil [4], [5], Garcia-Villalba and Fu´ster-
Sabater [11] and Tan [42], they have investigated the linear complexity of typical hardware
keystream generators. Konyagin et al. [16] and Meidl and Winterhof [25] considered the
linear complexity of the discrete logarithm function. For further information, one can refer
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to the books of Shparlinski [38], [39].
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2.2 Two Types of Nonlinear Filters
Generally speaking, there are two kinds of non-linear filters [32]. The first one is conducting
nonlinear operations on several states of one periodic sequence whose minimal polynomial
is irreducible. The other one is conducting nonlinear operations on the same state of several
periodic sequences. In this section, we will discuss these two types of nonlinear operations
on sequences over F2.
1. Nonlinear Operations on One Maximal Period Sequence
From the definition of the maximal period sequence, if its minimal polynomial is primitive
with degree k, then its minimal period is 2k−1. Although it has good statistical properties,
it is highly predictable in its first period. This is because its linear complexity k is very
small compared to its minimal period 2k − 1. Thus we need to employ some nonlinear
operations on k states of the sequence such that the linear complexity of the sequence
z˜ = (z1, z2, . . . , zi, . . .) filtered by the nonlinear device F , where each zj is given by zj =
F (sj, sj+1, . . . , sj+k−1), will exhibit large linear complexity. See Figure 2.2.
Suppose s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) is an arbitrary maximal period sequence with the primi-
tive minimal polynomialms˜(x) whose degree is L. And if we define σj = (sj, sj+1, . . . , sj+L−1),
it is already known that all σj are distinct and nonzero for j = 1, 2, . . . , 2
L − 1. Therefore,
the nonlinear filter F , a mapping from FL2 to F2, whose input is a vector with dimension
L, is uniquely determined by the output z˜ = (z1, z2, . . . , zi, . . .), where zj = F (σj). This
property does not hold ifms˜(x) is just irreducible but not primitive. From the discussion in
Chapter 3, there must be some sequences z˜ having large linear complexity equal or almost
equal to 2L−1. Given that we can choose each term of z˜ freely, then, there must exist some
nonlinear filter F such that the filtered sequences of arbitrary maximal period sequences
with period 2L − 1 have their linear complexities equal or almost equal to 2L − 1.
In fact, since the underlying field is F2, the function F is a sum of some products since
there is a unique canonical form, algebraic normal form for the boolean function F .
Therefore F can be represented by
F (x1, x2, . . . , xL) = a0 + a1x1 + a2x2 + · · ·+ aLxL
+a1,2x1x2 + a1,3x1x3 + · · ·+ aL−1,LxL−1xL
+ · · ·
+a1,2,...,Lx1x2 · · ·xL.
To obtain F such that F : s˜ 7→ z˜, we have three ways. Now let us briefly introduce
them. The first one is that representing F , i.e z˜, by the linear combination of the basis
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Figure 2.2: The First Kind of Nonlinear Filter.
of the linear space F2L−12 . Denote δi(s˜2
L−1) = (s1+i, s2+i, . . . , s2L−1, s1, s2, . . . , si) and s˜z˜ =
(s1z1, s2z2, . . .). When s˜
2L−1 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0), the following 2L − 1 sequences
δ0(s˜
2L−1), δ1(s˜2
L−1), . . . , δL−1(s˜2
L−1),
δ0(s˜
2L−1)δ1(s˜2
L−1), . . . , δ0(s˜2
L−1)δL−1(s˜2
L−1), . . . , δL−2(s˜2
L−1)δL−1(s˜2
L−1),
· · · · · ·
δ0(s˜
2L−1)δ1(s˜2
L−1) · · · δL−2(s˜2L−1)δL−1(s˜2L−1),
form a basis of F2L−12 . If we suppose the output of F with zero input is zero, we can set
the constant term in F being 0. Now denote the matrix of this basis by S. Therefore F
can be represented by
F (x1, x2, . . . , xL) = a1x1 + a2x2 + · · ·+ aLxL
+a1,2x1x2 + a1,3x1x3 + · · ·+ aL−1,LxL−1xL
+ · · ·
+a1,2,...,Lx1x2 · · ·xL,
where xi corresponds to δi(s˜
2L−1) above. Then the coefficients vector a of the variables in
F can be obtained by a = S−1(z˜2
L−1)T . Choosing this basis is very convenient since we
could directly connect some states of the LFSR generating s˜ by the logic AND and XOR
functions to implement F .
The second method is the same as the first one but employs a different basis, the natural
basis or impulse response sequences.
The third one is a little complex. Let Gz˜(x) be the generating polynomial for z˜ and
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gz˜(x) be the corresponding polynomial of z˜
2L−1. Then we have
Gz˜(x) =
gz˜(x)
1 + x2L−1
=
∑
i
ci(x)
pi(x)
deg(ci(x)) < deg(pi(x)),
where pi(x) is irreducible. For each LFSR whose reciprocal minimal polynomial is pi(x),
we can (by using natural basis) find the coefficients of its corresponding polynomial ci(x),
which are actually the initial states for the LFSR. For the ci(x) 6= 0, which means the cor-
responding pi(x) contributes to the linear complexity of z˜, we can determine a nonlinear
function fi,j for this LFSR such that the filtered sequence z˜i,j of s˜ by fi,j can simulate the
behavior of this LFSR initiated by the corresponding natural base ei,j, whose length and
jth term are equal to deg(pi(x)) and 1, respectively. More exactly, denote the coefficients
of ci(x) by ci (start from zero degree, deg(c1(x)) = 0). Let C = (c1, c2, . . . , cl). And
extend the basis from the natural basis for each LFSR according to their linear recurrence
relation determined by pi(x) such that each basis has length 2
L − 1. Denote the matrix of
this basis by D. Now the coefficients of F , a can be expressed by S−1DCT . One could re-
fer to [32, Section 5.1] for details and an example using the three methods introduced above.
However, in the above methods, we are facing some difficulties in application since we
have to solve a large-scale linear equation system with dimension 2L − 1. We want 2L − 1
to be large enough to achieve good security. But it renders computing F impossible.
The strategy to solve the computational difficulty for F is constructing F directly and
estimating the lower bound of the linear complexity of z˜ after having been filtered by F .
Lemma 2.1: Suppose s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) is a maximal period sequence over F2 with
its minimal polynomial ms˜(x) having degree L. Let ti s˜ = δti(s˜) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. Denote
α ∈ F2L a root of ms˜(x), the product
k∏
i=1
(ti s˜) by z˜ and the Hamming weight of the radix-2
form of N by w2(N). Then α
n, where w2(n) = k, is a root of the minimal polynomial
mz˜(x) of z˜ if
Dn =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
αt12
e1 αt22
e1 · · · αtk2e1
αt12
e2 αt22
e2 · · · αtk2e2
...
...
. . .
...
αt12
ek αt22
ek · · · αtk2ek
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
6= 0,
where n = 2e1 + 2e2 + · · ·+ 2ek and 0 ≤ e1 < e2 < · · · < ek < L.
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Proof: For the convenience of expression, we use i as internal index variable, which is only
effective for one step, and j as the global index variable, which is effective in the whole
proof. From (2.7), without loss of generality, we can assume sj = Tr(α
j) = TrF
qL
/Fq(α
j),
so
zj =
k∏
i=1
(tisj) =
k∏
i
Tr(αtiαj) (2.14)
=
k∏
i=1
(αtiαj + α2tiα2j + · · ·+ α2L−1tiα2L−1j).
Collect the coefficients of the αnij, then
zj =
∑
i
Eniα
nij, (2.15)
where ni = 2
eni,1 + 2eni,2 + · · · + 2eni,w2(ni) and 0 ≤ eni,1 < eni,2 < · · · < eni,w2(ni) < L.
Because Eni is only determined by ni and {t1, t2, . . . , tk}, so it is independent of j. And
when w2(ni) = k, we have Eni = Dni given that there is no difference between the positive
and minus signs in the determinant over F2.
Since we are working in F2, we can suppose the minimal polynomial for z˜ is
mz˜(x) = x
dN + xd(N−1) + · · ·+ xd1 ,
where dN > d(N−1) > · · · > d1 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have
zdN+j = zd(N−1)+j + zd(N−2)+j + · · ·+ zd1+j. (2.16)
By (2.14) and (2.16),
k∏
i=1
Tr(αtiαdN+j) +
k∏
i=1
Tr(αtiαd(N−1)+j) +
k∏
i=1
Tr(αtiαd(N−2)+j) + · · ·+
k∏
i=1
Tr(αtiαd1+j) = 0.
Given (2.15) and Eni is independent of j,∑
i
Eni(α
ni(dN+j) + αni(d(N−1)+j) + · · ·+ αni(d1+j)) =
∑
i
Enimz˜(α
ni)αnij = 0, (2.17)
for all j ≥ 1. Therefore, by constructing a Vandermonde determinant, we conclude that
Enimz˜(α
ni) = 0. (2.18)
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Hence, Eni 6= 0 implies αni is a root of the minimal polynomial mz˜(x) of z˜, which con-
tributes to the linear complexity of z˜. When w2(ni) = k, we have a very explicit expression
Dni for Eni , then the conclusion follows. 2
Lemma 2.2: Suppose s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) is a maximal period sequence over F2 with its
minimal polynomial ms˜(x) having degree L. Let (t+iφ)s˜ = δ(t+iφ)(s˜) for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1.
Denote the product
k−1∏
i=0
[(t+iφ)s˜] by z˜. If gcd(2
L − 1, φ) = 1, then L(z˜) ≥
(
L
k
)
.
Proof: Suppose α is a root of ms˜(x) in F2L and n = 2e1 + 2e2 + · · · + 2ek where 0 ≤ e1 <
e2 < · · · < ek ≤ L. Then,
Dn =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
αt2
e1 α(t+φ)2
e1 · · · α(t+(k−1)φ)2e1
αt2
e2 α(t+φ)2
e2 · · · α(t+(k−1)φ)2e2
...
...
. . .
...
αt2
ek α(t+φ)2
ek · · · α(t+(k−1)φ)2ek
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
k∏
i=1
αt2
ei
k∏
x=2
x−1∏
y=1
(αφ2
ex − αφ2ey ).
Therefore, Dn 6= 0 by considering gcd(2L − 1, φ) = 1. According to Lemma 2.1, αn is a
root of the minimal polynomial mz˜(x) of z˜. Because we have
(
L
k
)
values for n such that
w2(n) = k, mz˜(x) must have at least
(
L
k
)
roots. Hence, L(z˜) = deg(mz˜(x)) ≥
(
L
k
)
. 2
Theorem 2.4: Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) be a maximal period sequence over F2 with its
minimal polynomial ms˜(x) having degree L. Let (t+iφ)s˜ = δ(t+iφ)(s˜) for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1.
Denote the linear combination of products
N−1∑
x=0
k−1∏
y=0
cx[(tx+yφ)s˜] by z˜ where N is a posi-
tive integer, t0 < t1 < · · · < tN−1 and not all cj are zero. If gcd(2L − 1, φ) = 1, then
L(z˜) ≥
(
L
k
)
− tN−1.
Proof: Denote TrF
qL
/Fq(α
j) again by Tr(αj). Suppose α is a root ofms˜(x) in F2L . Similarly
as in (2.15),
zj =
N−1∑
x=0
k−1∏
y=0
cx[(tx+yφ)sj] =
N−1∑
x=0
k−1∏
y=0
cxTr(α
tx+yφαj) (2.19)
=
N−1∑
x=0
∑
i
cxEni(tx, y)α
nij. (2.20)
Here Eni(tx, y) is independent of j.
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Still as in Lemma 2.1, we suppose the minimal polynomial for z˜ is
mz˜(x) = x
dm + xd(m−1) + · · ·+ xd1 ,
where dm > d(m−1) > · · · > d1 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have
zdm+j = zd(m−1)+j + zd(m−2)+j + · · ·+ zd1+j.
By replacing each term with (2.19) and simplification,
N−1∑
x=0
k−1∏
y=0
cxTr(α
x+yφαdm+j)+
N−1∑
x=0
k−1∏
y=0
cxTr(α
x+yφαd(m−1)+j)+· · ·+
N−1∑
x=0
k−1∏
y=0
cxTr(α
x+yφαd1+j) = 0,
m∑
v=1
(
N−1∑
x=0
∑
i
cxEni(tx, y)α
ni(dv+j)) = 0,
∑
i
[
N−1∑
x=0
cxEni(tx, y)]mz˜(α
ni)αnij = 0. (2.21)
Since (2.21) holds for all j, then by constructing a Vandermonde determinant, we conclude
that
mz˜(α
ni)[
N−1∑
x=0
cxEni(tx, y)] = 0. (2.22)
Now we consider ni such that ni = 2
e1 + 2e2 + · · ·+ 2ek where 0 ≤ e1 < e2 < · · · < ek ≤ L.
Then
Eni(tx, y) =
k∏
i=1
αtx2
ei
k∏
p=2
p−1∏
q=1
(αφ2
ep − αφ2eq ).
Therefore,
N−1∑
x=0
cxEni(tx, y) = [
k∏
p=2
p−1∏
q=1
(αφ2
ep − αφ2eq )]
N−1∑
x=0
cxα
tx(
k∑
i=1
2ei )
= A
N−1∑
x=0
cxα
txni ,
where A =
k∏
p=2
p−1∏
q=1
(αφ2
ep − αφ2eq ) 6= 0 since gcd(2L − 1, φ) = 1. If αni is not a root of
B(x) = c(N−1)xt(N−1) + c(N−2)xt(N−2) + · · ·+ c0xt0 ,
then from(2.21) mz˜(α
ni) = 0, which implies αni contributes to the linear complexity of z˜.
Since there are at most tN−1 roots for B(x) and
(
L
k
)
choices for such ni, then we conclude
that
L(z˜) ≥
(
L
k
)
− tN−1.
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Figure 2.3: The Second Kind of Nonlinear Filter.
This completes the proof. 2
An immediate consequence of Theorem 2.4 is that L(z˜) ≥
(
L
k
)
− N + 1 by setting
ti = i for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. From the proof of Theorem 2.4, we can see that the obtained
lower bound for the linear complexity of the generated sequence is only due to ni in (2.20)
with w2(ni) = k. (In fact we neglect some roots because of the difficulty in the expression
of their coefficients in (2.21).) Then, the lower bound of the linear complexity of z˜ will
not decrease if we add some extra terms into (2.19), which can be expressed by summing
p < k products of si1+j, si2+j, . . . , sip+j where iq ∈ {tx + yφ} for 1 ≤ q ≤ p, 0 ≤ x ≤ N − 1,
and 0 ≤ y ≤ k− 1. In conclusion, to choose a nonlinear filter described in Figure 2.2 for a
maximal period sequence with linear complexity L, we only need to select some appropriate
parameters k, φ, cx, tm and dm, such that
z˜ =
N−1∑
x=0
k−1∏
y=0
cx[(x+yφ)s˜] +
N−1∑
m=0
p−1∏
n=0
dm[(tm+nφ)s˜],
where p < k. Then L(z˜) ≥
(
L
k
)
−N + 1.
2. Nonlinear Operations on Several Maximal Period Sequences
The second kind of nonlinear filter consists of a nonlinear mapping device F and several
maximal period sequence generating devices. Instead of using several different states of a
maximal period sequence as the input of F in the first kind of nonlinear filter, here we use
the same state of several different maximal period sequences is˜ generated by LFSRi as the
input. See Figure 2.3.
To obtain the main results, we need some more algebraic tools.
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Lemma 2.3: Suppose α ∈ Fqm and β ∈ Fqn , where gcd(m,n) = 1, then
TrFqm/Fq(α)TrFqn/Fq(β) = TrFqmn/Fq(αβ). (2.23)
Proof: Since m | mn and n | mn, Fqm and Fqm are both subfields of Fqmn . Therefore we
have
TrFqmn/Fq(αβ) =
mn−1∑
i=0
(αβ)q
i
=
mn−1∑
i=0
(α)q
i
(β)q
i
. (2.24)
Consider α ∈ Fqm and β ∈ Fqn , then αqi = αqi mod m and βqi = βqi mod n . Because
gcd(m,n) = 1, by the Chinese remainder theorem, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between i and (i mod m, i mod n). Therefore, replace i with (i mod m, i mod n) in (2.24)
and reorder the terms, then we have
TrFqmn/Fq(αβ) =
m−1∑
x=0
n−1∑
y=0
αq
x
βq
y
=
m−1∑
x=0
αq
x
n−1∑
y=0
βq
y
= TrFqm/Fq(α)TrFqn/Fq(β). (2.25)
2
Definition 2.8: Call α ∈ F∗qm a quintessential element of Fqm/Fq (or briefly of Fqm) if
{α, αq, αq2 , . . . , αqm−1} are all distinct.
An important fact is that a nonzero root of an irreducible polynomial f(x) over Fq is a
quintessential element of Fqdeg(f(x)) .
Lemma 2.4: Suppose gcd(m,n) = 1. Let α ∈ Fqm be a quintessential element of Fqm and
β ∈ Fqn be a quintessential element of Fqn . If gcd(q−1,m) = 1 and gcd(q−1, n) = 1, then
αβ is a quintessential element of Fqmn .
Proof: Firstly consider q = 2. Since m | mn and n | mn, F2m and F2n are both subfields of
F2mn , which implies αβ ∈ F2mn . Suppose (αβ)2x = (αβ)2y for some 0 ≤ x < y ≤ mn − 1,
then α2
x−2y = β2
y−2x . Because gcd(m,n) = 1, F2m ∩ F2n = F2. Then, we must have
α(2
x−2y) = c and β(2
y−2x) = c for some c ∈ F2. Then α2x mod m = cα2y mod m . Obvi-
ously, c must be 1. Otherwise we have α = 0. So c = 1 forces α(2
x−2y) = 1, which
implies x ≡ y mod m. Similarly, we can conclude x ≡ y mod n by considering β. Since
0 ≤ x, y ≤ mn− 1, we must have x = y. Contradiction to x < y.
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Finally, consider q > 2. Here we claim that for any two elements in {α, αq, αq2 , . . . , αqm−1},
one cannot be a scalar multiple over Fq of the other one. Suppose not, say we have
αq
x
= cαq
y
where c ∈ F∗q and x < y. Since cq = c, we can raise the identity αqx = cαqy
to the qth power for m − 1 times. Then we have m identities. Since αqx+i and αqy+i for
0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 run through all elements in {α, αq, αq2 , . . . , αqm−1}, then after multiplying
the m identities, we must have cm = 1. Therefore, the order ordc of c in F∗q , the smallest
positive integer such that cordc = 1, must divide q− 1 and m. However, gcd(q− 1,m) = 1.
Hence c = 1 which is a contradiction to the definition of a quintessential element.
Now suppose (αβ)q
x
= (αβ)q
y
for some 0 ≤ x < y ≤ mn − 1, then αqx−qy = βqy−qx .
Because gcd(m,n) = 1, Fqm ∩ Fqn = Fq. Then, we must have α(qx−qy) = c and β(qy−qx) = c
for some c ∈ F∗q. Then αqx mod m = cαqy mod m . By our above claim, c must be 1. So c = 1
forces α(q
x−qy) = 1, which implies x ≡ y mod m. Similarly, we can conclude x ≡ y mod n
by considering β. Since 0 ≤ x, y ≤ mn−1, we must have x = y. Contradiction to x < y. 2
Lemma 2.5: Let as˜ and bs˜ be two periodic sequences with the irreducible minimal poly-
nomials mas˜(x) and mbs˜(x) over Fq. Suppose deg(mas˜(x)) = m and deg(mbs˜(x)) = n with
q − 1,m, n being pairwise coprime. Then the minimal polynomial mz˜(x) of the product
sequence z˜ = (as˜)(bs˜) is irreducible in Fq with degree mn.
Proof: From (2.7), we can assume asj = TrFqm/Fq(θaα
j) and bsj = TrFqn/Fq(θbβ
j), where
mas˜(α) = 0, mbs˜(β) = 0 and θa ∈ Fqm θb ∈ Fqm are nonzero elements. Therefore, α is a
quintessential element of Fqm and β is a quintessential element of Fqn given the irreducibility.
Now
zj = (asj)(bsj) = TrFqm/Fq(θaα
j)TrFqn/Fq(θbβ
j). (2.26)
By Lemma 2.3, zj = TrFqmn/Fq(θ(αβ)
j) where θ = θaθb. Let
mz˜(x) = x
dm − am−1xd(m−1) − · · · − a1xd1 ,
where dm > d(m−1) > · · · > d1 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have
zdm+j = am−1zd(m−1)+j + am−2zd(m−2)+j + · · ·+ a1zd1+j.
Next for the simplicity of expression, we denote TrFqmn/Fq(x) by Tr(x) without confusion.
So we have
Tr(θ(αβ)dm+j)− am−1Tr(θ(αβ)dm−1+j)− · · · − a1Tr(θ(αβ)d1+j) = 0. (2.27)
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Expand each term in (2.27) and simplify it, then for j ≥ 1 we have
mn−1∑
i=0
θq
i
mz˜((αβ)
qi)(αβ)q
ij = 0. (2.28)
By Lemma 2.4, αβ is a quintessential element in Fqmn . Therefore, by constructing a
Vandermonde determinant, we conclude that
θq
i
mz˜((αβ)
qi) = 0 (2.29)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ mn − 1. Since θ 6= 0, (αβ)qi must be a root of mz˜(x), which implies the
minimal polynomial of αβ is a factor of mz˜(x). However, the minimal polynomial of αβ
is a characteristic polynomial after direct verification. Hence, mz˜(x) is the same as the
minimal polynomial of αβ, so it is irreducible over Fq and has degree mn. 2
Theorem 2.5: Let as˜ and bs˜ be two periodic sequences with the minimal polynomials
mas˜(x) and mbs˜(x) over Fq. Suppose deg(mas˜(x)) = m, the roots of mas˜(x) are simple and
lie in FqM \Fq, and none of its roots is a scalar multiple over Fq of its any other root. Also
suppose deg(m
bs˜(x)) = n, the roots of mbs˜(x) are simple and lie in FqN \ Fq and none of
its roots is a scalar multiple over Fq of its any other root. Let M,N , and q− 1 be pairwise
coprime. Then the minimal polynomial mz˜(x) of the product sequence z˜ = (as˜)(bs˜) has
mn simple roots in FqMN \ {FqM
⋃
FqN}.
Proof: Let Gas˜(x) and Gbs˜(x) be the generating functions of as˜, bs˜, respectively. Then by
(2.9) we have
Gas˜(x) =
gas˜(x)
m∗
as˜
(x)
=
∑
i
aQi(x)
aPi(x)
, where aPi(x) are all irreducible factors of mas˜(x),
G
bs˜(x) =
g
bs˜(x)
m∗
bs˜
(x)
=
∑
j
bQj(x)
bPj(x)
, where bPi(x) are all irreducible factors of mbs˜(x).
Obviously, deg(aQi(x)) < deg(aPi(x)) and deg(bQj(x)) < deg(bPj(x)). If we denote ami =
deg(aPi(x)) and bmj = deg(bPj(x)), then by the field theory, ami | M and bmj | N since
all the roots of mas˜(x) are in FqM and all the roots of mbs˜(x) are in FqN . Let ias˜ denote the
sequence corresponding to
aQi(x)
aPi(x)
, jbs˜ denote the sequence corresponding to
bQj(x)
bPj(x)
and ij z˜
be (ias˜)(
j
bs˜). Therefore,
z˜ = (as˜)(bs˜) = [
∑
i
(ias˜)][
∑
j
(jbs˜)] =
∑
i
∑
j
(ias˜)(
j
bs˜) =
∑
i
∑
j
(ij z˜). (2.30)
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Since M,N, q− 1 are pairwise coprime, we have ami,bmj, q− 1 are pairwise coprime for all
i, j. Now according to Lemma 2.5, we conclude that the minimal polynomial mij z˜(x) of
ij z˜
is irreducible and has degree (ami)(bmj). Hence we can represent the nth term of
ij z˜ by
ijzn = TrF
q
(ami)(bmj)
/Fq(AiBj(αiβj)
n), (2.31)
where Ai ∈ Fq(ami) , Bj ∈ Fq(bmj) , αi is a root of aPi(x) and βj is a root of bPj(x).
Given all αi ∈ FqM \ Fq, βj ∈ FqN \ Fq, we claim that the minimal polynomial over Fq
of αiβj and the minimal polynomial over Fq of αi′βj′ are different if i 6= i′ and j 6= j ′ .
Suppose not, then given that the roots of irreducible polynomials are conjugate, we have
αiβj = (αi′βj′ )
qc for some positive integer c. Then αiα
−qc
i
′ = β
qc
j
′ β
−1
j . Since FqM ∩FqN = Fq,
we conclude that αiα
−qc
i′ , β
qc
j′ β
−1
j ∈ Fq, which implies αi = dαq
c
i′ and β
qc
j′ = dβj for some
d ∈ Fq. Contradiction. Hence we conclude that the degree of the minimal polynomial
of z˜ is
∑
i,j
(ami)(bmj) =
∑
i
(ami)n = mn. Moreover, αiβj obviously lies in FqMN . If it
is in FqM , we have βj in FqM , contradiction. Similarly for FqN . So we conclude that
αiβj ∈ FqMN \ {FqM
⋃
FqN}. 2
Theorem 2.6: Let is˜ for i = 1, 2, . . . , N be periodic sequences over Fq, whose correspond-
ing minimal polynomials are m
is˜(x) with degree mis˜. Suppose all mis˜(x) have only simple
roots iαj ∈ Fqmi s˜ \Fq where j = 1, 2, . . . ,mis˜ and none of them is a scalar multiple over Fq
of i′αj′ , which is a root of mi′ s˜(x) for all 1 ≤ i
′ ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ′ ≤ m
i
′
s˜
. If gcd(m
is˜,mj s˜) = 1 for
all i 6= j, then z˜ =
N∏
i=1
(is˜) has the minimal polynomial mz˜(x) of degree
N∏
i=1
m
is˜ whose roots
are all simple and lie in Fqm \
⋃
j
Fqj where m =
N∏
i=1
m
is˜ and j runs through all (N − 1)th-
order products of m
is˜.
Proof: Let 1z˜ = (1s˜)(2s˜). Since none of the roots of mis˜(x) is a scalar multiple over Fq
of i′αj′ , which is a root of mi′ s˜(x) for all 1 ≤ i
′ ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ′ ≤ m
i
′
s˜
, then from the proof
of Lemma 2.4, we can neglect the requirement gcd(m
is˜, q − 1) = 1. Hence, by Theorem
2.5, we conclude that 1z˜ has the minimal polynomial m1z˜(x) of degree m1s˜m2s˜ whose roots
are all simple and lie in Fqm1 s˜m2 s˜ \ {Fqm1 s˜
⋃
Fqm2 s˜}. Then consider kz˜ = (k−1z˜)(k+1s˜) for
2 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 and use Theorem 2.5 repeatedly, the conclusion follows. 2
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Theorem 2.7: Suppose the nonlinear function F over Fq is given by
F (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = a0 +
∑
i
aixi +
∑
i,j
ai,jxixj + · · ·
+a1,2,...,nx1x2 · · ·xn,
where all the coefficients are in Fq. Let is˜ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n be sequences over Fq, whose
corresponding minimal polynomials are m
is˜(x) with degree mis˜. Suppose all mis˜(x) have
only simple roots iαj ∈ Fqmi s˜ \ Fq where j = 1, 2, . . . ,mis˜ and none of them is a scalar
multiple over Fq of i′αj′ , which is the root of mi′ s˜(x) for all 1 ≤ i
′ ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ′ ≤ m
i
′
s˜
. If
gcd(m
is˜,mj s˜) = 1 for all i 6= j, then
z˜ = F (1s˜, 2s˜, . . . , ns˜) (2.32)
has the minimal polynomial mz˜(x) of degree
M = F¯ (m1s˜,m2s˜, . . . ,mns˜), (2.33)
where F¯ is defined as F , but the coefficients for each term are 1 if the corresponding coef-
ficients of F are nonzero and zero otherwise.
Proof: For each term in (2.32), by Theorem 2.5, we know that the minimal polynomial of∏
j
(ij s˜) has degree
∏
j
m
ij
s˜. The nonzero scalar multiplication over Fq of a sequence does not
change its linear recurrence relations, which implies it does not change its linear complex-
ity. Since gcd(m
is˜,mj s˜) = 1 for all i 6= j, no two distinct terms in (2.32) after expansion
have the same minimal polynomial. Thus, the sum of all the terms in (2.32), z˜ must have
its minimal polynomial being the product of all the minimal polynomials of each terms
in (2.32). Consequently, deg(mz˜(x)) must be the sum of all the degrees of the minimal
polynomials of nonzero terms in (2.32), which is expressed by (2.33). 2
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2.3 The BAA Attacks on the Two Nonlinear Filters
The best affine approximation (BAA) attack was first introduced by Rueppel for the anal-
ysis of the S-boxes of the Data Encryption Standard in about 1986. And in 1988, C. Ding,
G. Xiao and W. Shan developed the BAA method to analyze stream ciphers with some
algebraic techniques and error-correcting techniques in [9]. Under the assumption that we
have known the nonlinear filter structure already, we will introduce it in this section. Here
we denote xy =
n∑
i=1
xiyi for x, y ∈ Fn2 and let ⊕ be the addition over F2.
Definition 2.9: Let f(x) be a function from Fn2 to F2. Then call wx⊕ l the best affine
approximation of f(x) for w, l ∈ Fn2 , if the sum over the real number field∑
x∈Fn2
f(x)⊕ wx⊕ l (2.34)
achieves its minimal value.
Definition 2.10: For x, y ∈ Fn2 , theWalsh function Q is defined to be Q(x, y) = (−1)xy.
Definition 2.11: For any Boolean function f : Fn2 → F2, define its first kind of Walsh
transformation Sf as
Sf (w) =
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
f(x)Q(w, x), (2.35)
and its second kind of Walsh transformation S(f) as
S(f)(w) =
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
Q(w, x)(−1)f(x). (2.36)
The relation between f and its two Walsh transformations is given by
f(x) =
∑
w∈Fn2
Sf (w)Q(w, x) =
1
2
− 1
2
∑
w∈Fn2
S(f)(w)Q(w, x), (2.37)
and
S(f)(w) =
−2Sf (w), w 6= 0,1− 2Sf (w), w = 0. (2.38)
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Theorem 2.8: Let Pf (wx⊕ l) denote the probability of f(x) = wx⊕ l for w, l ∈ Fn2 . Then,
Pf (wx) =
1
2
+
1
2
S(f)(w) and Pf (wx) =
1
2
− Sf (w) if w 6= 0 while Pf (wx) = 1 − Sf (w) if
w = 0.
Proof: By the definition of the second Walsh transform, we have
S(f)(w) =
1
2n
[#{x|f(x) = wx} −#{x|f(x) 6= wx}]
=
1
2n
[#{x|f(x) 6= wx} − 2n +#{x|f(x) = wx}]
=
1
2n
[2#{x|f(x) = wx} − 2n]
= 2Pf (wx)− 1
=
1
2n
[2n − 2#{x|f(x) = wx⊕ 1}]
= 1− 2Pf (wx⊕ 1).
(2.39)
Now from the above formula and (2.38), the conclusion follows. 2
Theorem 2.9: LetM = max{|S(f)(w)| | w ∈ Fn2} and |S(f)(w0)| =M . If S(f)(w) ≥ 0, then
w0x is the best affine approximation of f(x) and the probability of agreement is given by
Pf (wx) =
1
2
+
1
2
M ; else, where S(f)(w) < 0, w0x⊕1 is the BAA and Pf (wx⊕1) = 1
2
+
1
2
M .
Proof: From (2.39), we have Pf (wx) =
1
2
+
1
2
S(f)(w) and Pf (wx⊕ 1) = 1
2
− 1
2
S(f)(w), then
the conclusion is obvious. 2
Under the assumption of knowing the nonlinear filter, we could find |S(f)(w0)| =
max{|S(f)(w)| | w ∈ Fn2} by computation before the cipher analysis. Then if |S(f)(w0)|
is big enough to guarantee a high agreement probability between F and w0x, then we can
use w0x to replace the nonlinear filter F , which will decrease the linear complexity of the
filtered key stream dramatically. This is the basic idea of the BAA attack. Let us consider
a nonlinear filter of the first kind pictured in Figure 2.2 for example. Suppose the sequence
generated by LFSR has linear complexity 2L and the nonlinear filter F is given by
F (x1, x2, . . . , x2L) =
L∑
i=1
xi +
2L∏
j=L+1
xj. (2.40)
According to the results in Section 2.2, we know the filtered sequence has the linear com-
plexity greater than
(
2L
L
)
− L if we fill each variable in F as in Theorem 2.4. But after
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computing the second kind of Walsh transform of F , we have M = max{|S(F )(w)| | w ∈
Fn2} = 1− 21−L with w0x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xL and PF (w0x) =
1
2
+
1
2
S(F )(w0) = 1− 2−L.
Obviously, when L ≥ 10, PF (w0x) ≥ 0.999. And after replacing the nonlinear filter F
by w0x, the linear complexity of the generating key stream is less than or equal to the
linear complexity of the sequence obtained by the LFSR before filtering, which decreases
from
(
2L
L
)
− L to 2L with very high agreement probability greater than 0.999 if L ≥ 10.
Therefore, if we know 2L bits of the key stream, we could predict the following key stream
bits with high correct probability, which means the BAA attack to this nonlinear filter F
defined by (2.40) is very successful.
By a similar method, we conduct the BAA attack on the second kind of nonlinear filter
depicted in Figure 2.3. Suppose the linear complexity of LFSRi in Figure 2.3 is mi, and the
nonlinear filter F is given by (2.40) too. Then still after some computation, we have found
w0x = x1⊕x2⊕· · ·⊕xL and PF (w0x) = 1
2
+
1
2
S(F )(w0) = 1−2−L. Denote z˜ =
L∑
i=1
(is˜) over
F2. So we have Gis˜(x) =
g
is˜(x)
m∗
is˜
(x)
, which implies G∑
j
(j s˜)(x) =
∑
j
g
j s˜(x)
m∗
j s˜
(x)
=
gz˜(x)∏
j
m
j s˜(x)
. Let F¯
be defined as in Theorem 2.7. Since the reciprocal polynomial of the minimal polynomial
of z˜ is a factor of
∏
j
m
j s˜(x) and z˜ is periodic, L(z˜) ≤
L∑
i=1
mi, which will be generally much
smaller than F¯ (m1,m2, . . . ,mL). Hence, with 2
L∑
i=1
Li consecutive bits of the key stream,
we can predict all the bits with the correct probability almost being 1. Therefore, the BAA
attack can successfully break the key stream generated by the 2L LFSRs and filtered by
the F defined in (2.40).
Chapter 3
Random Sequences and Their Linear
Complexity Profiles
From the proof of perfect security of the Vernam one-time pad cipher in Section 1.2, we
see that just a random sequence being the key stream over Fq is sufficient to guarantee
perfect security. So the task cryptographers face is to construct random sequences to be
the key streams. But how to describe the randomness using mathematical language, or
equivalently, how to measure unpredictability by mathematical tools? Answers to these
questions are the core contents in this chapter. After we justify the method to measure
the randomness by linear complexity profiles of sequences, we will explore the probabilistic
properties of random sequences.
3.1 Randomness of Sequences
In this section, we will discuss the basic fundamentals of a reasonable tool to measure
randomness. Firstly, let us consider the outputs of finite state machines. Suppose M is
an n-state machine and it is embedded in the finite field F with k elements. Each time
M maps its internal states to an output. Since it could only have kn different n-tuples
{si1, si2, . . . , sin} for i = 1, 2, . . . , kn as its internal state, after finitely many steps, which is
equal to or less than kn, the internal states must repeat. Therefore, its outputs must be
ultimately periodic with the ultimate period being equal to or less than kn. IfM is a linear
device, then the ultimate period of the outputs is a divisor of (kn − 1). So we have:
Theorem 3.1 The outputs of any finite state machine are ultimately periodic.
42
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Proof: By the above discussion. 2
From Theorem 3.1, we know that any key stream coming from the practical key gen-
erators in our real world must be ultimately periodic. Say a key stream has the period T .
Then the key stream could be generated by the Linear Feedback Shift Register si+T = si
for i = 1, 2, . . .. Therefore, all the key streams could be implemented by LFSRs. Also the
“ultimately periodic” property of the finite state machine outputs forces that we cannot
generate an infinite random looking sequence, hence the best thing we can expect for the
key stream is that the first period of the sequence looks random. So we are confined to the
sequences with only finitely many terms.
1. Non-Regularity
From our intuition, a random sequence must highly lack any regularity, so each state of the
sequence is difficult to predict, or equivalently, unpredictable. Difficulty of prediction means
that the probability of successful guessing is very small. Since most of our key generators
are embedded in F2, we could say that for each bit of the key stream, the chances of correct
prediction should be equal to or less than
1
2
. Then as the finite sequences are concerned,
the longer they are, the more difficult to predict. But one should notice that, just the small
probability of the sequence being chosen from a very huge candidate space is necessary but
not sufficient to mean the unpredictability at all. For example, let us look at the following
four sequences over F2 whose lengths are all 40:
s1 = (0000000000000000000000000000000000000000)
s2 = (0110011001100110011001100110011001100110)
s3 = (1001000000000011000000000101001100000001)
s4 = (0101110001101001101010110101101110010110)
No one would dispute that the four sequences are with the equal probability 2−40 if we
choose randomly from the space F402 and the probability is really small enough to be viewed
as 0. However, the four sequences are quite different. For s1, it is all zeros. So we could
describe it by all bits are 0. If someone sees the first ten or fifteen bits of s1, this person
could guess easily that the following bits are all 0. As for s2, we could get it by repeating
0110 for 10 times. Some persons could easily and correctly guess all the remaining bits
after observing three or more 0110. Both of s1 and s2 have so regular patterns that they
are easily predicted. But for s3 and s4, there are no no obvious regular patterns.
Let us explore more. No regular patterns implies the sequence needs much data to be
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described exactly. If there is some regular pattern in the sequence, we could compress the
data to represent it. Still from our intuition, the more regular the sequence is, the less
data is needed to describe it. Refer to the above example again:
Sequence Representation Data Volume /characters
s1 40 0s. 6
s2 10 0110s. 9
s3 1001, 10 0s, 11, 9 0s,1010011, 7 0s, 1. 39
s4 0101110001101001101010110101101110010110. 41
One can see that the highly regular sequences s1 and s2 could be represented just by a few
characters with the data volume much less than their original lengths. So they are not
good candidates for our “random sequences”. Conversely, s3 and s4 are almost without
regularity, which means there is some difficulty to predict each bit, and they are repre-
sented with nearly the same data volumes as their lengths. So we conclude that random
sequences should be represented by almost the same amount of data as expressing them
directly. This empirical analysis inspires us to measure the randomness of the sequence by
the data volume or the size of its representation. Obviously, the description method with
the minimal data volume interests us most:
Use abstract programs to denote the different representation ways for a sequence. Say
all the programs producing the sequence s are {Pi} for i = 1, 2, . . ., then, the randomness
of s could be measured by the size of Ps, the smallest one in {Pi}.
Actually this approach leads to the formal concept of Kolmogorov complexity. In
1964 and 1965, R. Solomonov in [41] and A. Kolmogorov in [15] had used the “pattern-
lessness” of a finite sequence, which is the length of the shortest Turing machine program
generating it, to measure the randomness of this finite sequence. By the above method,
we could say the bigger the size of Ps is, the more random s should be. But one thing
which should be noticed is that for sequences with small lengths it is difficult to measure
their randomness. Why? Because their lengths are already small, the data volume of dif-
ferent representations may not be more efficient to express them than by showing each bit
directly. Look at the extreme case where the sequence only has one bit. So is {0} random
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or {1} random? Maybe both. Maybe none.
2. Uniform Distribution
Another intuition of the random sequences is related to their distribution properties. Since
each bit of the sequence is independent and uniformly distributed, we could expect the
occurring frequency of each k-tuple for k = 1, 2, . . . is almost equal and the bigger k is,
the smaller the frequency of each k-tuple. And the theoretical value for the frequency of a
k-tuple (b1, b2, . . . , bk) in a binary sequence with length n should be:
Pk =
#{vi = (si, si+1, . . . , si+k−1) | vi = (b1, b2, . . . , bk)}
n− k + 1 ≈ (
1
2
)k.
Let k = 1 for instance, then the number of 1’s and the number of 0’s should be
almost the same in a random sequence. Now look again at the four sequences s1, s2, s3, s4
above. Obviously s1 is not uniformly distributed since there is no 1 in it. s3 is lacking
regularity, but from the distribution viewpoint, the frequency
9
40
of 1’s is much smaller
than
1
2
. Therefore we do not consider s3 to be a good candidate for random sequences. If
a hacker had observed, say, the first 20 bits of s3, then she/he calculates the frequency of
1 and 0. After finding the frequency of 0 is nearly 3 times the frequency of 1, then she/he
could guess most of the next 20 bits are 0’s, which is true. After decoding the plaintext
obtained by the hacker using guessing but with high correct probability for each bit, she/he
may successfully extract the information by using the language redundancy. So s3 being
a key stream is not secure. As for s4, it looks uniformly distributed, in addition to the
independence of each of its bits (which means it is without any regularity). Therefore, we
expect that s4 could be a good key stream. In fact, s4 is produced by the author tossing a
fair Singapore one dollar coin.
However, a sequence with uniform distribution does not necessarily lack regularity. Re-
call the maximal period sequences. If their linear complexities are L, then their periods are
2L−1. And in [18, Chapter 6], the authors have shown that the maximal period sequences
pass the probabilistic tests in one of their minimal periods. These so-called pseudo-noise
sequences with 2L − 1 bits are highly predictable if L consecutive terms are observed, al-
though they have good distribution properties.
After the above discussion from our intuition, we could postulate some requirements on
a random looking finite sequence to satisfy our aims for constructing a good key stream,
although we even do not know whether there exist any finite truly random sequences.
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Call these sequences Pseudo-Random Sequences. Requirements for a good pseudo-random
sequence S should include:
• S should have no regularity. This also means that the data volume of any represen-
tation for S must be incompressible compared to the original length of S.
• S should have uniform distribution. Any k-tuples should have equally occurring
probability for k = 1, 2, . . . and the probability decreases while k increases.
• The minimal period of S should be long enough to display some uncertainty since
randomness is meaningless for short sequences.
3. Measuring Randomness by Linear Complexity Profile
In fact, a good and practical representation method of a finite sequence, which is used
to measure the randomness, was developed in the 1970s. As mentioned before, in 1964
and 1965, R. Solomonov in [41] and A. Kolmogorov in [15] used the length of the shortest
Turing machine program generating it to measure the randomness of a finite sequence. P.
Martin-Lo¨f further developed this approach in 1966 in [19]. Finally in [17], A. Lempel and
J. Ziv justified using the shortest length of LFSR models to measure the unpredictability of
the sequences in 1976. Referring to the discussion of “non-regularity”, each Pi is replaced
by an LFSR with an initial state, so the linear complexity of s is a measurement of its
randomness. This is very appealing postulation because each key stream generated by
some finite state machine can be produced by an LFSR and there is also a very efficient
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to compute its linear complexity profile. One could refer to
the papers of the above authors and [6, Chapters 3, 5, 6] for rigorous mathematical proofs
from logic and algorithm perspectives.
Recall the definition of the linear complexity profile in Chapter 2. Now let us look at
the following sequence obtained from s4 above by the author tossing a fair Singapore coin
with length 31 and expand it by repeating the first 31 bits:
s˜ = (0101110001101001101010110101101)∞.
Then use the Berlekamp-Massey LFSR Synthesis Algorithm (the program by Maple 9.01
is in the Appendix) to find the linear complexity profile of s˜ for its first 62 bits:
L(s˜62) = [0, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 6, 6, 6, 6, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 8, 11, 11, 11, 11, 12, 12, 13, 13,
14, 14, 15, 15, 16, 16, 17, 17, 17, 19, 19, 19, 19, 21, 21, 21, 21, 23, 23, 23,
23, 23, 23, 27, 27, 27, 27, 27, 27, 29, 29, 29, 29, 31, 31, 31]
Chapter 3: Random Sequences and Their Linear Complexity Profiles 47
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 3.1: The Linear Complexity Profile of s˜70.
Obviously, the minimal period of s˜ is 31. Plot the first two periods and 8 more bits as well
as their corresponding linear complexities in Figure 3.1.
One can see that the graph of the linear complexity profile of s˜ is quite close to the line
L(s˜n) =
n
2
and L(s˜n) stays at 31, its minimal period, after n = 61. Some properties showing
in this figure are not by chance. In fact, the linear complexity profile of unpredictable
sequences over F2 should be close to the
n
2
-line, at least for the first period. On one hand,
since the pseudo-random sequence are incompressible, the minimal data volume needed
to represent this sequence should be almost the same as its length. So does using LFSR.
On the other hand, for an LFSR with length L, to decide all its outputs, we need L
coefficients to determine the LFSR characteristic polynomial (notice that it is a monic
polynomial), and L values for the initial state. So 2L values are needed to determine the
outputs. Consider both, then 2L ≈ |s˜| = n. So the graph should display the property that
L(s˜n) ≈ n
2
while n ≤ T . While T < n ≤ 2T , this property should still keep to some extent,
since after repeating several bits with length less than the minimal period, it is hard to
estimate the minimal period just by observing the first n bits where n < 2T − n0 (here n0
is a small positive integer dependent on T ). Also because the period of s˜ is T = 31, it could
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be generated by si+T = si for all i. Then, L(s˜) ≤ T = 31. So 31 is the biggest possible
ultimate value for L(s˜n). Therefore, generally, the linear complexity profile of random
sequences should increase approximately as the
n
2
-line, which means its linear complexity
profile should be close to {n
2
} for n = 1, 2, . . . 2T , and achieve the minimal period T after
2T bits. A remark should be stated here. High linear complexity itself does not mean
unpredictable. For example, look at the sequence
s˜c = (0000000000000000000000000000001).
Although the linear complexity of s˜c being 31 is the same as s˜ pictured in Figure 3.1, its
linear complexity increases sharply at the 31st bit from 0 to 31, which does not grow close
to the
n
2
-line at all. And this sequence does not have uniform distribution either. So many
zeros and their regular distributions make this sequence highly predictable. Actually, in
the next chapter, one will see that the 1-error linear complexity of s˜c is zero, which renders
s˜c very insecure as a key stream.
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3.2 Probabilistic Properties of Random Sequences
Now we will explore the probabilistic properties of sequences over some finite field in order
to find the expected linear complexity, the variation, and the expected increasing ratio
of the linear complexity. In this way, we could estimate the number of good candidate
sequences for key streams and find average behaviors of sequences randomly chosen from
all the candidates. At last, periodic sequences will be considered since most key streams
in practical use are periodic.
1. The Number of Sequences over Fq with Linear Complexity c
Firstly, we must determine the number Nn(c) of all sequences over Fq whose linear com-
plexities are c and lengths are n since this enumeration is fundamental for all discussions
of the probabilistic properties. To determine Nn(c), there are at least four methods known
up to now. The first one is based on a recursion method. One could refer to [32, Chapter
4] for a special case and expand it to the general case without difficulties. Another method
relies on the continued fraction expansion of the generating function, a Laurent series. A
detailed discussion could be found in [28, Chapter 7]. The third one is offered by W. Meidl
recently based on the relationship between linear complexity profiles and lattice profiles
in [21]. Now by introducing two concepts, jump point and balance point, we use a fourth
approach based on the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to compute Nn(c).
Definition 3.1: Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) be a sequence over a finite field Fq, then k ≥ 1
is called a jump point if L(s˜k−1) < L(s˜k).
Definition 3.2: Call the number 2k ≥ 2 a balance point if L(s˜2k) = k.
Lemma 3.1: The number of jump points is equal to the number of balance points in a
sequence s˜n = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) over Fq, where n ≥ 2L(s˜n).
Proof: Note that sequences in our discussion begin from s1, so s0 is not defined. But if
we define s0 = 0 and L(s˜
0)=0, then the lemma must be true because between two balance
points, there must be a jump point (refer to Figure 3.2) and any jump point at i must
satisfy L(s˜i) >
i
2
according to Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. 2
Lemma 3.2: Let s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) be a sequence over a finite field Fq. Suppose
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Figure 3.2: Jump points (•) and balance points (¥).
the balance points are {i1, i2, . . . , it}, all being even numbers by definition, then the jump
points less than it are at:
{i1
2
,
i1 + i2
2
, . . . ,
it−1 + it
2
}.
Proof: There is one and only one jump point sx between sij , sij+1 . Also, according to
the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, L(s˜x) = x − L(s˜x−1). So we have ij+1
2
= x − ij
2
, then
x =
ij + ij+1
2
. 2
Remark: Lemma 3.2 means that if two adjacent balance points are given, then the jump
point between them is their middle term.
Now based on the above lemma, we conclude that a linear complexity profile is uniquely
determined by the set of balance points. So we are ready to determine the number of dif-
ferent linear complexity profiles, with the last linear complexity term being c.
Theorem 3.2: Suppose all the sequences discussed have n terms. Then the number of
different possible linear complexity profiles for the linear complexity c is 2c−1 if 0 < c ≤ n
2
,
and is 2n−c if c > n
2
.
Proof: Firstly, suppose 0 < c ≤ n
2
, then according to Lemma 3.2, the linear complexity
profile corresponds to the set of balance points. So we just need to choose some even num-
bers from {2, 4, 6, . . . , 2(c− 1)} to be the balance points in order to construct some linear
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Figure 3.3: Obtaining the jump point from its two adjacent balance points I.
complexity profile. Since this set has (c−1) elements, the total number N of choices is the
number of subsets of this set, which is N = 2c−1. Secondly if c >
n
2
, the last balance point
sx must satisfy
x+ 2c
2
≤ n since the last jump point is in front of sn. So the set to choose
the balance points’ subscripts changes to {2, 4, . . . , 2(n− c)}. Now the total number N of
choices is the number of subsets of this set, which is N = 2n−c. 2
After the enumeration of different linear complexity profiles for the linear complexity
c, we proceed by exploring the number of candidate sequences for each linear complexity
profile. Firstly, let c be a linear complexity, satisfying c ≤ n
2
, and k be the number of
balance points, satisfying k ≤ c − 1. Start from s1 to sn. If (i, L(s˜i)) is under the n
2
-line,
then the value of si is decided by the previous elements {s1, s2, . . . , si−1}. If i is a jump
point, then it can be any element of Fq except a special value (which is decided by the
previous terms). If (i, L(s˜i)) is above or on the
n
2
-line, then the choice for it is totally
free. So let B = {i | i is a jump point}, D = {i | L(s˜i) ≥ n
2
}. Then for this kind of linear
complexity profile, there are (q − 1)|B|q|D|−|B| candidate sequences over Fq.
From Lemma 3.1, we have |B| = k. Now let us determine |D| − |B|. Suppose ik and
ik+1 are two adjacent balance points and consider ik+1, ik+2, . . . , ik+1. Refer to Figure 3.3
above. Clearly, L(s˜j) <
j
2
when j = ik +1, ik +2, . . . ,
ik + ik+1
2
− 1. Therefore the number
of graph points (m,L(s˜m)) above and on the
n
2
-line is
ik+1 − ik
2
+1 in the interval (ik, ik+1].
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Figure 3.4: Obtaining the jump point from its two adjacent balance points II.
This means that the number of points belonging to D is
ik+1 − ik
2
+ 1. If we combine all
these intervals between balance points, we can get |D| = 2c
2
+ k. Then |D| − |B| = c,
which implies (q − 1)|B|q|D|−|B| = (q − 1)kqc.
Consider the other situation of c >
n
2
, and suppose ik and δ are the last balance point
and jump point, respectively. See Figure 3.4.
In {1, 2, . . . , ik}, there are ik
2
+ k − 1 elements lying in D by the above argument since
ik = 2× ik
2
. Now in the last interval (ik, n], there are n− δ + 1 elements on or above the
n
2
-line. However, we have δ =
2c+ ik
2
. So the total number in D is n − c. Therefore, in
this situation the number of candidate sequences for the linear complexity profile is given
by (q − 1)|B|q|D|−|B| = (q − 1)kqn−c. We summarize the two results:
Theorem 3.3: Suppose a linear complexity profile is {A1, A2, . . . , An = c} and there are
k different values in {A1, A2, . . . , An}, where 0 ≤ A1 ≤ A2 ≤ · · · ≤ An = c and Ai is an
integer for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n . Then the number of candidate sequences over Fq for this linear
complexity profile, whose lengths are n, is:
N =
(q − 1)kqc if 0 < c ≤ n2 ,(q − 1)kqn−c if c > n
2
.
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Proof: By the above discussion. 2
Based on Theorem 3.3, we can determine the exact number Nn(c) of sequences over
Fq, with length n, whose linear complexities are c. The method is that: if 0 < c ≤ n
2
,
choose i, where 0 ≤ i ≤ c, balance points from {2, 4, 6, . . . , 2(c − 1)}. If c ≥ n
2
, choose
i, s.t. 0 ≤ i ≤ (n − c), balance points from {2, 4, 6, . . . , 2(n − c)} except 0. So for both
situations, there are i+ 1 jump points. Then compute the number of candidate sequences
having this special linear complexity profile. In the end, we can get the number Nn(c) just
by summing all the numbers of the sequences for a special linear complexity profile.
Theorem 3.4: The number Nn(c) of sequences s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) over Fq, of length
n, whose linear complexities are exactly c, is:
Nn(c) =
(q − 1)q2c−1 if 0 < c ≤ n2 ,(q − 1)q2n−2c if c > n
2
.
Proof: Sum up all the candidate sequences for each linear complexity profile with the final
value, i.e. the linear complexity of each sequence, being c:
If 0 < c ≤ n
2
,
Nn(c) =
c−1∑
i=0
(q − 1)i+1qc
(
c− 1
i
)
= (q − 1)qc(1 + q − 1)c−1 = (q − 1)q2c−1.
If c ≥ n
2
,
Nn(c) =
n−c∑
i=0
(q − 1)i+1qn−c
(
n− c
i
)
= (q − 1)qn−c(1 + q − 1)n−c = (q − 1)q2n−2c.
2
This is a method different from the other three we described at the beginning of this
section. We can obtain more information on the structure of the sequences with a given
linear complexity. For example, recall the phenomenon in the last section that the linear
complexity profiles of random sequences are close to the
n
2
-line. Actually, this implies that
in a random sequence, there are many balance points because the more the balance points,
the closer the linear complexity graph is to the
n
2
-line. By Theorem 3.3, a large value
for the number of balance points means a large number of the candidate sequences when
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q 6= 2. Therefore, we could expect that a sequence chosen randomly will exhibit a close
relationship between its linear complexity profile and the
n
2
-line.
2. The Expected Linear Complexity
Next we will use the result of Theorem 3.4 to obtain the expected linear complexity
E[L(S˜n)] of the finite sequences of variables S˜n = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn) with length n over Fq.
We view all {Si} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n to be n independent random variables. Let P (X = xi)
be the probability of X = xi. By definition,
E[L(S˜n)] =
qn∑
i=1
L(s˜ni )P (S˜
n = s˜ni ), where s˜
n
i ∈ Fnq . (3.1)
Since the Si are independent and uniformly distributed random variables, then each se-
quence s˜i must be chosen with equal probability. So we have P (S˜
n = s˜ni ) =
1
qn
. Then,
(3.1) can be simplified to
E[L(S˜n)] =
1
qn
qn∑
i=1
L(s˜ni ).
Now divide the qn sequences into n + 1 groups (one group is with the linear complexity
being 0). For each group, all the sequences lying in it have the same linear complexity. So
we have:
E[L(S˜n)] =
1
qn
n∑
c=1
c×Nn(c) = 1
qn
(
bn
2
c∑
c=1
c(q − 1)q2c−1 +
n∑
c=dn+1
2
e
c(q − 1)q2n−2c). (3.2)
Compute each sum term in the above formula (3.2) by introducing a formal variable: we
have
k∑
i=1
iq2i−1 =
(q2k − k − 1)q2k+1 + q
(1− q2)2 , so we get that:
bn
2
c∑
c=1
c(q − 1)q2c−1 =

(q − 1)(q
2 − 1)nqn+1 − 2qn+1 + 2q
2(1− q2)2 if n is even,
(q − 1)(q
2 − 1)nqn − (q2 + 1)qn + 2q
2(1− q2)2 if n is odd.
(3.3)
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And we obtain
k∑
i=1
iq2n−2i = q2n−2k(
q2k+2 − (k + 1)q2 + k
(1− q2)2 ), so
n∑
c=dn+1
2
e
c(q−1)q2n−2c =

(q − 1)(q
2 − 1)nqn + 2qn+2 − 2(n+ 1)q2 + 2n
2(1− q2)2 for even n,
(q − 1)(n+ 1)q
n+3 − (n− 1)qn+1 − 2(n+ 1)q2 + 2n
2(1− q2)2 for odd n.
(3.4)
Now we are ready to conclude the exact value of E[L(S˜n)]:
Theorem 3.5: The expected linear complexity E[L(S˜n)] of the variable sequence S˜n =
(S1, S2, . . . , Sn) over Fq, where all the random variables {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} are independent
and uniformly distributed, is:
E[L(S˜n)] =

n
2
+
q
(q + 1)2
− 1
qn
( n
1 + q
+
q
(1 + q)2
)
if n is even,
n
2
+
(q2 + 1)
2(1 + q)2
− 1
qn
( n
1 + q
+
q
(1 + q)2
)
if n is odd.
(3.5)
Proof: Sum the results of (3.3) and (3.4). 2
Recall that an LFSR with linear complexity L needs 2L data to specify a sequence and
the random sequence needs almost the same amount of data as its length to represent it.
So to obtain an ideal candidate sequences space that by randomly choosing would return
a sequence with the expected linear complexity being half of its length, we at least need to
guarantee lim
n→∞
E(L(S˜n))
n
=
1
2
. Since
q
(q + 1)2
is decreasing when q > 1,
q
(q + 1)2
≤ 2
9
and
lim
q→∞
q
(q + 1)2
= 0. Also
(q2 + 1)
2(1 + q)2
≤ 1
2
although it is increasing when q > 1. Therefore,
Theorem 3.5 tells us that the expected linear complexity over any finite field will have the
value quite close to
n
2
just with a slight difference less than
1
2
. As a result, our status quo
has naturally achieved the ideal situation that a randomly chosen sequence from Fnq will
exhibit randomness with respect to having a linear complexity close to
n
2
.
3. The Variance of the Linear Complexity
Now, let us look at the variance of the linear complexity of all the sequences with length
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n over Fq since it is the second important parameter characterizing randomly chosen se-
quences. By definition, the variance V [L(S˜n)] is given by:
V [L(S˜n)] = E([L(S˜n)− E[L(S˜n)]]2) = E([L(S˜n)]2)− (E[L(S˜n)])2. (3.6)
Because we already have E[L(S˜n)], the rest of our task is to compute
E([L(S˜n)]2) =
qn∑
i=1
[L(s˜ni )]
2P (S˜n = s˜ni ) =
1
qn
qn∑
i=1
[L(s˜ni )]
2
=
1
qn
n∑
c=1
c2 ×Nn(c) = 1
qn
[
bn
2
c∑
c=1
c2(q − 1)q2c−1 +
n∑
c=dn+1
2
e
c2(q − 1)q2n−2c].
Following the same procedures by introducing a formal variable but with much more com-
plicated computation, we have
k∑
i=1
i2q2i−1 =
q2k+1(q2 − 1)2k2 − 2q2k+1(q2 − 1)k + (q2k − 1)(q3 + q)
(q2 − 1)3 ,
k∑
i=1
i2q2n−2i =
(q2k+2 + q2k − q2 − 1)q2n−2k+2 − q2n−2k(q2 − 1)2k2 − 2q2n−2k+2(q2 − 1)k
(q2 − 1)3 .
Now we are ready to obtain the main result for this part:
Theorem 3.6: The variance V [L(S˜n)] of the linear complexity of the variable sequence
S˜n = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn) over Fq, where all the random variables {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} are indepen-
dent and uniformly distributed, is:
V [L(S˜n)] =
q5 + q4 + 4q3 + q2 + q
(q − 1)2(q + 1)4 +
1
qn
O(n) +
1
q2n
O(n2). (3.7)
Proof: By the above two summation formulas and many computations with quite compli-
cated simplifying steps, we have that when n is even,
E([L(S˜n)]2) = [
1
4
− 1
(q + 1)qn
]n2+[
q
(q + 1)2
− 2q
2
(q − 1)(q + 1)2qn ]n+[
q(q2 + 1)
(q2 − 1)2−
q(q2 + 1)
(q2 − 1)2qn ],
and while n is odd,
E([L(S˜n)]2) = [
1
4
− 1
(q + 1)qn
]n2+[
q2 + 1
2(q + 1)2
− 2q
2
(q − 1)(q + 1)2qn ]n+[
q4 + 6q2 + 1
4(q2 − 1)2 −
q(q2 + 1)
(q2 − 1)2qn ].
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By (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain:
V (L(S˜n)) =

q5 + q4 + 4q3 + q2 + q
(q − 1)2(q + 1)4 −
1
qn
H1(q, n)− 1
q2n
H2(q, n) if n is even ,
q5 + q4 + 4q3 + q2 + q
(q − 1)2(q + 1)4 −
1
qn
H3(q, n)− 1
q2n
H4(q, n) if n is odd.
(3.8)
And the exact value of each Hi(q, n) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is:
H1(q, n) =
q(q2 + 3)n
(q − 1)(q + 1)3 +
q(q4 + 6q2 + 1)
(q − 1)2(q + 1)4 ,
H2(q, n) = H4(q, n) =
n2
(q + 1)2
+
2qn
(q + 1)3
+
q2
(q + 1)4
,
H3(q, n) =
(3q2 + 1)n
(q − 1)(q + 1)4 +
4q2(q2 + 1)
(q − 1)2(q + 1)4 .
Since lim
n→∞
n2
qn
= 0 when q > 1, we have lim
n→∞
Hi(q, n)
qn
= 0 for any fixed q ≥ 2. Therefore,
the assertion of (3.7) is established. 2
On one hand,
n
qn
goes to zero very fast when n is increasing given q ≥ 2. Say n = 10,
then the difference between V (L(S˜n)) and
q5 + q4 + 4q3 + q2 + q
(q − 1)2(q + 1)4 is less than 0.01 given
that the coefficients of the highest degree n terms in Hi(q, n) are smaller than 1. On the
other hand, v(q) =
q5 + q4 + 4q3 + q2 + q
(q − 1)2(q + 1)4 is strictly decreasing while q ≥ 2 and v(2) ≈
1, v(3) ≤ 0.5. Therefore, V (L(S˜n)) is really small with the value less than 86
81
. On the
whole, we conclude that the linear complexity of s˜n chosen randomly from Fnq should be
very close to the expected value which is almost
n
2
in most cases. To get a numerical
concept of this conclusion, we employ Chebyshev’s inequality. Therefore, we have
P{|L(S˜n)− E[L(S˜n)]| ≥ r} ≤ V (L(S˜
n))
r2
. (3.9)
If we let r = 3, (3.9) implies that about 90% of the sequences over any finite field with
length n will have their linear complexities in the range
n
2
± 3.
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Figure 3.5: One step of random walk: (a) L(s˜n) = l0 ≤ n
2
, (b) L(s˜n) = l0 >
n
2
4. The Random Walk of Linear Complexity
Suppose s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) and L(s˜
n) = l0. By the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, the
linear complexity of s˜n+k will change to n + k − l0 from l0 for some k if sn+k does not
satisfy the linear recurrence relation decided by the previous terms. Therefore, it is quite
natural to consider the expected value for k, which is the average length of the steps of
the “random walk” under or above the
n
2
-line. See Figure 3.5. This characterization of
random sequences over F2 was first investigated by Rueppel in [32, Chapter 4]. Now we
extend his discussions on binary sequences to the sequences over Fq without any difficulty.
Denote the infinite sequences over Fq by the variable sequence S˜ = (S1, S2, . . . , Si, . . .).
And here the Si are uniformly and independently distributed random variables over Fq.
Now suppose the first n terms are given by Si = si ∈ Fq for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Firstly, consider
L(s˜n) = l0 ≤ n
2
described in Figure 3.5 (a). Then since each Sj for j ≥ n + 1 must hold
one and only one exact value in Fq to keep the line straight, then the probability of the
first jump point n + k happening when k = i0 is
1
qi0−1
× (1 − 1
q
). Therefore, given q > 1
implying the convergence of the following infinite sum, the expected value for the random
variable k is
E(k) =
∞∑
i=1
i× 1
qi−1
× q − 1
q
=
q
q − 1 , where l0 ≤
n
2
. (3.10)
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Secondly, consider L(s˜n) = l0 >
n
2
by looking at Figure 3.5 (b). Then there must be no
jump point while k ≤ 2l0 − n by the Berlekamp-Massay algorithm. Then we just need to
concern about the variable terms after S2l0 by neglecting the values of {Sn+1, Sn+2, . . . , S2l0−1}.
By (3.10) the expected value of the random variable k′ = k − (2l0 − n), which represents
the step length starting from 2l0, is
q
q − 1. Therefore, we have
E(k) = (2l0 − n) + q
q − 1 , where l0 >
n
2
. (3.11)
Based on the above discussion, it is easy to conclude that the expected value for the
random variable w representing the length between two balance points is
2q
q − 1. A little
more computation will return the variance of w:
V (w) = E(w2)− [E(w)]2 =
∞∑
i=1
(q − 1)i2
qi
− ( q
q − 1)
2 =
10q − 3
(q − 1)2 . (3.12)
Since f(q) =
10q − 3
(q − 1)2 is decreasing when q ≥ 2, and f(2) = 17, f(q) =
10q − 3
(q − 1)2 has to
be less than or equal to 17. And when q ≥ 13, the variance is already less than 1. Now
summarize the above discussions to:
Theorem 3.7: Let S˜ = (S1, S2, . . . , Si, . . .) be an infinite sequences of independent and
uniformly distributed random variables over Fq. If Si = si ∈ Fq for i = 1, 2, . . . n, and
L(s˜n) = l0 where s˜
n = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), then the expected length k, such that n + k is the
first appearing jump point after n, is
E(k) =

q
q − 1 , if l0 ≤
n
2
,
(2l0 − n) + q
q − 1 , if l0 >
n
2
.
(3.13)
And the expected length between two balance points is
2q
q − 1 with the variance
10q − 3
(q − 1)2 .
Proof: By (3.10), (3.11), and (3.12). 2
From Theorem 3.7, we could expect that the graph of the linear complexity profile of
a random sequence would look like “an irregular staircase” with most step lengths being
the expected value
2q
q − 1 and most stair heights being
q
q − 1 especially when q ≥ 13.
Again refer to Figure 3.1. Although all terms are over F2 and only finitely many terms
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Figure 3.6: The Linear Complexity Profile of ps˜20
are involved, it really shows “a typical irregular staircase” with step length 4 and height
2. One should pay attention to the word “irregular”. Randomness necessarily needs
the non-regularity as we discussed in Section 1. So any regular characteristics should
be excluded from a true random sequence. Although V (w) is not very big especially
when q ≥ 13 as shown in Theorem 3.7, one cannot expect a random sequence to have
a regular linear complexity graph, which means all or almost all the “stairs” have the
length
2q
q − 1 and the height
q
q − 1. A very famous example is given by the binary sequence
ps˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) where,
si =
1, if i = 2j − 1, for j = 1, 2, . . . ,0, otherwise .
This sequence can be represented in a very simple way and it is almost a zero se-
quence. Therefore, it cannot be a random sequence from our viewpoints because each bit
in this sequence is highly predictable. However, in [32, Chapter 4], the author has shown
that L(ps˜n) = bn+ 1
2
c for n = 1, 2, . . .. So the step length and the step height in the
graph of its linear complexity are 4 and 2 respectively, which are both exactly the expected
values (see Figure 3.6), which implies that the linear complexity graph of ps˜ is very regular.
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5. Some Discussions on Periodic Sequences
In most cases, the key generators will generate periodic sequences since they are imple-
mented by linear devices such as LFSRs. Therefore the expected linear complexity of
periodic sequences should be considered. In this part, a heuristic argument is provided
and related research results are listed but without rigorous mathematical proofs.
Let s˜T = (s1, s2, . . . , sT ) be the first T terms of the infinite periodic sequence s˜ =
(s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .) over Fq , where T is its minimal period and each si for i = 1, 2, . . . , T
is uniformly and independently chosen from Fq. Based on the linear recurrence relation
si+T = si, the expected linear complexity of s˜ = (s˜
T , s˜T , · · · , s˜T ) must be equal to or
less than T . Let s(x), s∗(x) be the generating polynomial for s˜ and the corresponding
polynomial of s˜T respectively, then we have
s(x) =
s∗(x)
1− xT =
s1 + s2x+ . . .+ sTx
T−1
1− xT =
n∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
ci,j(x)
[Pi(x)]j
, (3.14)
where Pi(x) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are the irreducible factors over Fq with the multiplicities mi
of xT − 1 and deg[ci,j(x)] < deg[Pi(x)] for all i, j. For fixed T , it is well known that there
is a bijective mapping between s∗(x) and the partial fraction expansion
n∑
i=1
mi∑
j=1
ci,j(x)
[Pi(x)]j
.
Therefore, all the coefficients of ci,j(x) are chosen independently and uniformly from Fq
means so are all the coefficients of s∗(x). This proposition implies that all si for i =
1, 2, . . . , T are selected uniformly and independently from Fq just as random variables.
Therefore, computing the expected linear complexity of the periodic sequence s˜ could be
done by computing the expected degree of the minimal polynomial of s˜ given that all the
coefficients of ci,j(x) for all i, j are chosen independently and uniformly from Fq.
However, obtaining the expected degree of the minimal polynomial directly is generally
not easy for a symbol parameter T because it is difficulty to find all the factors over Fq
of xT − 1 and their corresponding multiplicities are highly dependent on T . Firstly, let
us consider two extreme cases for the general conclusion. For the first one, let q = 2 and
T = qp − 1 = 2p − 1 where p is a prime. In [32, Chapter 4], it was shown that
E[L(s˜)] ≥ e− 1p (2p − 3
2
). (3.15)
Therefore, from (3.15) we conclude that E[L(s˜)] ≈ 2p − 1 − 1
2
= T − 1
2
≈ T as p → ∞,
which implies that the expected linear complexity of the periodic sequence s˜ is close to T ,
its minimal period, when T is big enough. The other extreme case is given by T = 2n. Still
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in [32, Chapter 4], the author proved that the infinite sequence S˜ generated by repeating
(S1, S2, . . . , ST ), a sequence of T independent and uniformly distributed binary variables,
has the expected linear complexity
E[L(s˜)] = 2n − 1 + 1
22n
≈ T. (3.16)
Hence, from the above two extreme but heuristic cases, we conclude that the expected
linear complexities of periodic sequences should be close to their minimal periods in general
cases. This conjecture was first given by Rueppel in [32, Chapter 4] in 1986, but it was not
proved in the following 16 years. In 2002, Meidl and Niederreiter proved it by employing
the generalized discrete Fourier transform in [24].
Suppose w ≥ 1 and j ≥ 0 are both integers and gcd(q, w) = 1, then the cyclotomic
coset Cj mod w with respect to powers of q is defined as
Cj = {0 ≤ k ≤ w − 1 : k ≡ jqr mod w for some r ≥ 0}.
Now let T = pvw, where p is the characteristic of Fq, v ≥ 0 and gcd(p, w) = 1. By
employing the different cyclotomic cosets mod w, {Bi} for i = 1, 2, . . . , h, Meidl and
Niederreiter [24] proved that
E[L(s˜)] = T −
h∑
j=1
|Bj|(1− q−|Bj |pv)
q|Bj | − 1 . (3.17)
Then, for any T , by (3.17) we can deduce E[L(s˜)] > T− w
q − 1. Especially, when gcd(T, q) =
1, we have E[L(s˜)] ≥ (1 − 1
q
)T . It is likely and easy to see E[L(s˜)] and T are quite close
if q is big or w is small. For some small q like q = 2, in [24], it was also shown that
E[L(s˜)] ≥ T − w + 2
3
when w > 0 and E[L(s˜)] ≥ 3T − 1
4
when w = 0. To sum up,
the expected linear complexities of periodic sequences are actually close to their minimal
period.
Therefore, by recalling the discussions in the last two sections, we could expect that
periodic sequences will have almost the same performance as or be indistinguishable from
random sequences with respect to the linear complexity profiles in their first two periods.
On the whole, from all the discussions in this chapter, we could expect that a sequence
over Fq generated by a key generator should have these properties to simulate random
sequences with respect to the linear complexity:
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• Its linear complexity profile graph should be close to the n
2
-line in its first two periods.
• Its linear complexity graph should consist of irregular staircases with average height
q
q − 1 and average length
2q
q − 1 in its first two periods.
• Its linear complexity should be close to its minimal period.
Chapter 4
The k-Error Linear Complexity
As we mentioned, all the practical stream ciphers are implemented by linear devices, es-
pecially by Linear Feedback Shift Registers for hardware reasons. Since the Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm is very efficient to compute the linear complexity of any sequences over
Fq, a cryptographically strong key stream should necessarily have a large linear complexity
so that from some previous states of the key stream, even if their amount is relatively huge,
it is impossible to decide the structure of the key generator for obtaining the key stream.
However, only large linear complexity itself does not guarantee the cryptographic
strength. Suppose the linear complexity of a key stream decrease dramatically after chang-
ing k terms, where k is relatively small compared to the key stream length. Then it is easy
to decide the altered key stream or so called k-error key stream by the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm. Although the plaintext obtained by using the k-error key stream is not exactly
the original plaintext, one could recover all or most of the errors in the plaintext by the
information redundancy because the number of errors in the plaintext is relatively small
compared to the length of the plaintext given k being small. Therefore, another important
parameter to measure the security of the key stream is the so-called k-error linear com-
plexity. A cryptographically strong key stream must not only have big linear complexity
but also have large k-error linear complexity for relatively small k. In this chapter, we will
investigate the latter characteristic of the sequences.
4.1 Bounds for the k-Error Linear Complexity
Generally speaking, it is hard to decide the exact value of the k-error linear complexity
given a sequence over any finite field Fq. However, by employing some tools in number
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theory, we could estimate the k-error linear complexities of periodic sequences. Obviously,
we are more concerned about the lower bound. So in this section, we will develop some
tools to obtain lower bounds for the k-error linear complexity. Firstly, let us give the exact
definition of the k-error linear complexity.
Definition 4.1: Let s˜ni = (s
i
1, s
i
2, . . . , s
i
n) and s˜
n
j = (s
j
1, s
j
2, . . . , s
j
n) be two sequences over
Fq. Then the Hamming distance d between s˜ni and s˜nj is defined to be
d(s˜ni , s˜
n
j ) =
n∑
k=1
tk, where tk = 0 if s
i
k = s
j
k, and tk = 1 otherwise.
Definition 4.2: Let s˜n = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) be a sequence over Fq, k be an integer such that
0 ≤ k ≤ n and s˜ne be an error sequence of s˜n with length n over Fq. Then the k-error
linear complexity Lk(s˜
n) of s˜n is defined to be
Lk(s˜
n) = min
d(s˜ne ,s˜
n)≤k
L(s˜ne ).
Some notation should be clarified here. In Definition 4.2, we just define the k-error
linear complexity for finite sequences. However, in this chapter, we are more concerned
about the infinite periodic sequences with minimal period T . So we specify the notation
Lk(s˜) for s˜ = (s1, s2, . . . , si, . . .), where s˜ is an infinite periodic sequence with minimal
period T , to represent the value of min
s˜Te
{L[(s˜Te )∞] | d(s˜Te , s˜T ) ≤ k}.
Before any discussion, we should offer an extreme example to show the dramatic dif-
ference between the linear complexity and the k-error linear complexity of a sequence. Let
us consider
s˜c = (0000000000000000000000000000001).
By the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, the linear complexity of s˜c is 31, the same as its
length. However, its 1-error linear complexity is obviously 0 since the Hamming distance
between s˜c and the zero sequence with length 31 is just 1.
To find the connection between periodic sequences over Fq and number theory, we need
to introduce some number-theoretic tools first.
Definition 4.3: Let n be a positive integer and B = {mi | gcd(n,mi) = 1 and 1 ≤ mi ≤
n}. Then the Euler function φ(n) is defined to be |B|, the cardinality of the finite set B.
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Definition 4.4: Let ϕ, n be positive integers such that gcd(ϕ, n) = 1. Then the order
of ϕ modulo n, denoted by ordn(ϕ), is defined to be the smallest positive integer k such
that ϕk ≡ 1 mod n.
Definition 4.5: Call ϕ a primitive root modulo n if ordn(ϕ) = φ(n). For an element
ξ ∈ Fq, if n is the smallest positive number such that ξn = 1 over Fq, then ξ is called an
nth primitive root unity over Fq.
Definition 4.6: Let n be a positive integer and p be the characteristic of Fq, where p - n.
Let ξ be an nth primitive root of unity over Fq. Then the nth cyclotomic polynomial
over Fq is defined to be
Qn(x) =
∏
1≤s≤n, gcd(s,n)=1
(x− ξs).
From the definitions, it is not hard to obtain some basic properties. For the Euler
function, it is actually multiplicative, which means that for any positive integers m,n, if
gcd(m,n) = 1, then φ(mn) = φ(m)φ(n). For the cyclotomic polynomial we have:
1. deg[Qn(x)] = φ(n).
2. xn − 1 = ∏
d|n
Qd(x).
3. Qn(x) is independent of the choice of the nth primitive root of unity.
4. Suppose Qn(x) =
φ(n)∑
i=0
aix
i, then ai ∈ Fq for all i.
5. If gcd(q, n) = 1, then Qn(x) is factored into
φ(n)
d
distinct monic irreducible polyno-
mials in Fq[x] with the same degree d, where d is the order of q mod n, ordn(q).
Other interesting properties of Euler function, primitive root and cyclotomic polynomial
with rigorous mathematical proofs can be found in [30, Chapter 6] and [18, Chapter 2].
Lemma 4.1: Let n1, n2, . . . , nt be positive integers and gcd(ni, nj) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t.
Suppose m ≥ 1 is an integer with gcd(nk,m) = 1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t, then
ordn1n2···nt(m) = lcm[ordn1(m), ordn2(m), . . . , ordnt(m)].
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Proof: Let n = n1n2 · · ·nt. Since gcd(ni, nj) = 1 for i 6= j, by the Chinese remainder
theorem, we have Zn ∼= Zn1 × Zn2 × · · · × Znt and the isomorphism f is given by
f(x mod n) = (x mod n1, x mod n2, . . . , x mod nt).
Denote lcm[ordn1(m), ordn2(m), . . . , ordnt(m)] by l. On one hand, given that f(1) is the
unit of Zn1 × Zn2 × · · · × Znt , for any positive integer d such that md ≡ 1 mod n, we have
f(md mod n) = f(1 mod n) = (1, 1, . . . , 1) = (md mod n1, m
d mod n2, . . . , m
d mod nt).
This forces md ≡ 1 mod ni for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Therefore ordni(m) | d for all i, which implies
that l must divide d. Thus, we have
lcm[ordn1(m), ordn2(m), . . . , ordnt(m)] | ordn(m). (4.1)
On the other hand,ml ≡ 1 mod ni for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Therefore, f(ml mod n) = (1, 1, . . . , 1),
which forces ml ≡ 1 mod n. So by the definition of order, we have
ordn(m) | lcm[ordn1(m), ordn2(m), . . . , ordnt(m)]. (4.2)
By (4.1) and (4.2), we conclude that ordn(m) = lcm[ordn1(m), ordn2(m), . . . , ordnt(m)].2
Lemma 4.2: Let p be a prime, then for any positive integers k and c with gcd(c, p) = 1
we have ordpk(c) ≥ ordp(c).
Proof: Let d = ordpk(c). Then c
d ≡ 1 mod pk. Hence, cd ≡ 1 mod p. Still by the definition
of order, we have that ordp(c) | d = ordpk(c), which implies ordpk(c) ≥ ordp(c). 2
Now based on the above two lemmas, we are ready to set up the connection between
periodic sequences and number theory. This connection originated from [10] and was de-
scribed in detail in [8, Chapter 3]. From now on, use w(s˜n) = w[(s1, s2, . . . , sn)] to represent
the Hamming weight of s˜n.
Theorem 4.1: Let N = pe11 p
e2
2 · · · pett , where p1, p2, . . . , pi are pairwise distinct primes
and ei ≥ 1 for all i. Let q be a prime power such that gcd(q,N) = 1. Suppose k <
min{w(s˜N), N−w(s˜N)}, then for each periodic sequence s˜ over Fq with the minimal period
N ,
L(s˜) ≥ min{ordp1(q), ordp2(q), . . . , ordpt(q)},
Lk(s˜) ≥ min{ordp1(q), ordp2(q), . . . , ordpt(q)}.
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Proof: Recall the properties we listed earlier for cyclotomic polynomials, and the fact that
s˜ is periodic with minimal period N . Next, we note that a characteristic polynomial for s˜
is
xN − 1 =
∏
ni|N
Qni(x).
which is the same as its reciprocal polynomial. And Qni(x) is the product of
φ(ni)
ordni(q)
distinct monic irreducible polynomials over Fq with the same degree ordni(q).
Suppose ni | N , then we have ni = pri1i1 p
ri2
i2
· · · prisis , where 1 ≤ rij ≤ eij for 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
Here 1 ≤ s ≤ t. According to Lemma 4.1, we have
ordni(q) = lcm[ordp
ri1
i1
(q), ord
p
ri2
i2
(q), . . . , ord
p
ris
is
(q)].
Therefore, ordni(q) ≥ max[ordpri1i1 (q), ordp
ri2
i2
(q), . . . , ord
p
ris
is
(q)]. By Lemma 4.2, however,
we have
ordni(q) ≥ max[ordpri1i1 (q), ordp
ri2
i2
(q), . . . , ord
p
ris
is
(q)]
≥ max[ordpi1 (q), ordpi2 (q), . . . , ordpis (q)]
≥ min[ordp1(q), ordp2(q), . . . , ordpt(q)].
Hence the degree of the minimal polynomial for every periodic sequence over Fq with the
minimal period N must be equal to or greater than ordni(q). Proposition 2.1 implies that
L(s˜) ≥ min{ordp1(q), ordp2(q), . . . , ordpt(q)}. (4.3)
Now because k < min{w(s˜N), N − w(s˜N)}, after changing the same k terms in every
minimal period of s˜ , the error sequence must be non-constant and it is still periodic
with the period N . Then its minimal polynomial cannot be x − 1. Therefore, its linear
complexity should be equal to the degree of the product of some factors of xN − 1. Hence,
we have that
Lk(s˜) ≥ min{ordp1(q), ordp2(q), . . . , ordpt(q)}. (4.4)
2
Now, from Theorem 4.1, we see the basic connection between the lower bounds for the
linear complexity and the k-error linear complexity of a sequence and number theory. In
fact, the main idea of Theorem 4.1 inspires us to find some special N and q, such that all
the nontrivial factors of xN − 1 over Fq, except x− 1, have large degrees.
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4.2 Lower Bounds for the k-Error Linear Complexity
with Special Period
To proceed for the lower bounds, we need some preparation on the existence of the prim-
itive roots modulo n. Denote the group of units of Z/nZ by (Z/nZ)∗, where n ≥ 2 is an
integer. Then it is well known that (Z/nZ)∗ is a cyclic group if and only if n = 2, 4, pm, 2pm
for some odd prime p. Therefore, we could find g ∈ (Z/nZ)∗ such that it is a primitive
root modulo n if n = 2, 4, pm, 2pm. In fact, this assertion originated from a number theory
result first given by C. F. Gauss in the book Disquisitiones Arithmeticae. One could refer
to lots of books on number theory, for example [34, Section 33], for details and proofs.
Furthermore, to serve our purpose, we just cite a useful result on primitive roots modulo
n = pm from number theory but without showing proofs.
Lemma 4.3: Let p, k be an odd prime and a positive integer, respectively. Say g is a
primitive root modulo p. Then
• g is also a primitive root modulo p2 if gp−1 6≡ 1 mod p2.
• g + p is a primitive root modulo p2 if gp−1 ≡ 1 mod p2.
• g is a primitive root modulo pk+1 if g is a primitive root modulo pk, where k ≥ 2.
Proof: Refer to [30, Theorem 8.8, Theorem 8.9]. 2
Now we are ready to obtain some good bounds for the k-error linear complexity based
on Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.3.
Theorem 4.2: Let p be an odd prime and N = pm where m ≥ 1. For any nonconstant
sequence s˜ = (s˜N)∞ whose period is N over Fq, if q is a primitive root modulo p and
qp−1 6≡ 1 mod p2, then for any k < min{w(s˜N), N − w(s˜N)} we have Lk(s˜) ≥ p− 1.
Proof: Firstly, from Lemma 4.3, we conclude that q is a primitive root modulo pt for any
t ≥ 2. From the property (2) of the cyclotomic polynomials we listed, we have that in the
finite field Fq, the characteristic polynomial of s˜ can be factored as
xN − 1 = xpm − 1 = (x− 1)
m∏
i=1
Qpi(x). (4.5)
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By the property (5) of the cyclotomic polynomials, Qpi(x) could be factored into
φ(pi)
ordpi(q)
ir-
reducible polynomials over Fq. However, by Lemma 4.3, ordpi(q) = φ(pi). That means that
Qpi(x) itself is an irreducible polynomial over Fq. Since φ(pi) = (p− 1)pi−1, deg[Qpi(x)] =
(p − 1)pi−1 ≥ p − 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Still according to k < min{w(s˜N), N − w(s˜N)},
the k-error sequence s˜e after changing the same k terms in its every period cannot be a
constant sequence. So 1 and x− 1 cannot be its minimal polynomial. Hence we conclude
that Lk(s˜) ≥ p− 1. 2
It is known that for every prime p, there are φ[φ(p)] = φ(p − 1) primitive elements in
(Z/pZ)∗. Now suppose q + pZ ∈ (Z/pZ)∗ is the generating element of this cyclic group
under multiplication, and the representing element q satisfying 1 < q ≤ p − 1 is equal to
some power of some prime. Then the significance of Theorem 4.2 arises: if we have a huge
prime p, then according to Theorem 4.2, we could obtain an ideal lower bound.
Proposition 4.1: Let p be an odd prime. For any nonconstant sequence s˜ = (s˜p)∞ whose
period is p over Fq, if q is a primitive root modulo p, then for any k < min{w(s˜p), N−w(s˜p)}
we have Lk(s˜) ≥ p− 1.
Proof: Let m = 1. Then the conclusion directly follows Theorem 4.2 and its proof. 2
Proposition 4.1 tells us that for a periodic sequence with its period being a large prime
p, if the cardinality of its underlying field is a primitive root modulo p, then the k-error
linear complexity for s˜ = (s˜p)∞ has a lower bound just slightly less than its period. Since
the difference is just 1, this lower bound could be viewed the same as its period. Still by
the same argument in Theorem 4.2, we have the linear complexity of this sequence is p or
p− 1, which also could be viewed the same as its period. Therefore, s˜ = (s˜p)∞ is an ideal
key stream with respect to the linear complexity and k-error linear complexity since both
of them almost achieve the maximal value, the minimal period of the sequence.
Since the cardinality of any finite field must be a power of some prime, the remaining
task is to find a primitive root q modulo pm, such that q = rt where r is a prime.
Definition 4.7: Let g, n be positive integers such that gcd(g, n) = 1. Call e the negative
order modulo n of g if e is the smallest positive integer such that ge ≡ −1 mod n and
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denote it by nordn(g).
Lemma 4.4: For n > 4, g is a primitive root modulo n if and only if
φ(n)
2
is the negative
order of g mod n.
Proof: (=⇒) Suppose g is a primitive root modulo n. Then by definition or Fermat’s
little theorem, gφ(n) ≡ 1 mod n. Recall the fact that there are primitive roots mod-
ulo n if and only if n = 2, 4, pe, 2pe. Therefore, φ(n) must be an even number. Then
gφ(n) − 1 = (g φ(n)2 + 1)(g φ(n)2 − 1) = In, where I is an integer. Hence, g φ(n)2 must be equiv-
alent to -1 modulo n, otherwise we will have g
φ(n)
2 ≡ 1 mod n, which contradicts to g is a
primitive root modulo n. This proves the existence of the negative order of g mod n and
informs us that nordn(g) ≤ φ(n)
2
. Obviously, φ(n) = ordn(g) | 2nordn(g). This forces
nordn(g) ≥ φ(n)
2
, then nordn(g) =
φ(n)
2
.
(⇐=) Consider nordn(g) = φ(n)
2
. Then ordn(g) | φ(n) = 2nordn(g). Suppose ordn(g) <
nordn(g) =
φ(n)
2
, then let e ≡ nordn(g) (mod ordn(g)) < nordn(g). However, ge ≡
−1 mod n. Contradicts to the definition of negative order. If nordn(g) ≤ ordn(g) <
2nordn(g), e = 2nordn(g) − ordn(g) is also less than nordn(g), which leads to another
contradiction ge ≡ −1 mod n. Therefore, we must have ordn(g) ≥ 2nordn(g) = φ(n). Still
by Fermat’s little theorem, we conclude that ordn(g) = φ(n). 2
Lemma 4.5: If g is a primitive root modulo n, where n is an integer greater than 2, it
must not be a quadratic residue modulo n.
Proof: Primitive root implies that g
φ(n)
2 ≡ −1 mod n. If g is a quadratic residue, by sup-
posing g ≡ g20 mod n, then g
φ(n)
2 ≡ gφ(n)0 ≡ 1 mod n, which is an immediate contradiction
given n > 2. 2
Therefore, from Lemma 4.5, if rt is a primitive root modulo pm, then t is necessarily an
odd integer. Because the key streams embedded in the finite field with characteristic 2 are
easy to be implemented by hardware, we are more concerned about r = 2 here. Next we
will check whether 2t = 22u+1 for some non-negative integer u is a primitive root modulo
pm or not based on the above lemmas. Generally, it is not easy to decide the primitive root
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modulo pm especially when p is huge. Therefore, we limit p to some special forms and m
to be 1 for discussion. Introduce two properties of the Legendre symbol from [29, Chapter
3]. Suppose p is an odd prime and gcd(a, p) = gcd(b, p) = 1, then(
a2b
p
)
=
(
b
p
)
,
(
−1
p
)
= (−1) p−12 . (4.6)
Therefore by (4.6), for 22u+1 and the odd prime p, we have(
22u+1
p
)
=
(
2
p
)
= (−1) p
2−1
8 =
+1 if p = 8a+ 1, or p = 8a+ 7,−1 if p = 8a+ 3, or p = 8a+ 5. (4.7)
If the Legendre symbol of p modulo n is 1, then p is a quadratic residue. If the Legendre
symbol of p is -1, then p is not a quadratic residue modulo n.
Theorem 4.3: If p = 4p∗ + 1 where p∗ is a prime and 24u+2 < p − 1, then 22u+1 is a
primitive root modulo p.
Proof: By Fermat’s little theorem and given φ(p) = 4p∗, after factoring, we have
(22u+1)φ(p) − 1 ≡ [(22u+1)φ(p)2 + 1][(22u+1)p∗ + 1][(22u+1)p∗ − 1] ≡ 0 mod p. (4.8)
Firstly, by (4.6), −1 is a quadratic residue. Then since p∗ = 2a + 1 is a prime, p must be
in the form of 8a+ 5. Because(
[22u+1]p
∗
p
)
=
(
22up
∗+2a+1
p
)
=
(
2
p
)
= −1,
we conclude that (22u+1)p
∗
is not a quadratic residue, which implies (22u+1)p
∗ 6≡ ±1 mod p.
Therefore, we must have (22u+1)
φ(p)
2 ≡ −1 mod p. Hence nordp(22u+1) | 2p∗. Now consider
0 < 24u+2 < p − 1, so we have (22u+1)2 6≡ −1 mod p. Thus, by employing the fact that
(22u+1)p
∗ 6≡ −1 mod p, nordp(22u+1) must be equal to 2p∗ = φ(p)
2
. Then by Lemma 4.4,
22u+1 is a primitive root modulo p. 2
Of course, there are lots of results on primitive roots by setting different conditions on
the modulus n. One could refer to [8, Section 3.4] for different conclusions. Moreover, in
[7] one could find discussions on the distribution properties of primitive roots over finite
fields. Also one could refer to [37] for algorithms to find primitive roots. Now combine the
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results of Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, we could achieve our aims to construct the ideal
key streams, for which both linear complexities and k-error linear complexities are almost
the same as their minimal periods with the little difference being 1 at most.
Theorem 4.4: Let N = p = 4p∗ + 1 be an odd prime and q = 22u+1, where p∗ is also a
prime and q2 < p − 1. For any nonconstant periodic sequence s˜ = (s˜N)∞ with the period
N (minimal) over Fq we have L(s˜) ≥ N − 1, and for any k < min{w(s˜N), N − w(s˜N)} we
have Lk(s˜) ≥ N − 1.
Proof: From Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3, we have Lk(s˜) ≥ N−1 for any k < min{w(s˜N), p−
w(s˜N)}. Then let k = 0, we have L(s˜) ≥ N − 1. 2
However, up to now, we still do not have any good method to find such big primes
p = 4p∗+1 where p∗ is also a prime. Whether there are infinitely many such primes is still
one of the difficult open problems in number theory. Right now the only available method
for constructing these primes is just searching a large prime table for a matched pair (p, p∗)
such that p = 4p∗ + 1.
For the probabilistic properties, one could refer to Meidl and Niederreiter [23], [24] for
lower bounds on the expected value of the k-error linear complexity. A special case when
the period N is a prime different from the characteristic of Fq, was considered in [22].
Bibliography
[1] N. Abramson, Information Theory and Coding, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963.
[2] J. O. Bruer, On pseudorandom sequences as crypto generators, Proceeding Int. Zurich
Seminar on Digital Commmunication, Switzerland, 1984.
[3] J. A. Buchmann, Introduction to Cryptography, Second Edition, Springer, New York,
2004.
[4] P. Caballero-Gil, Regular cosets and upper bounds on the linear complexity of certain
sequences, Sequences and Their Applications (C. Ding, T. Helleseth, and H. Nieder-
reiter, eds.), pp. 161-170, Springer, London, 1999.
[5] P. Caballero-Gil, New upper bounds on the linear complexity, Computational Mathe-
matics Applications, vol. 39, no. 3-4, pp. 31-38, 2000.
[6] C. Calude, Information and Randomness, An Algorithmic Perspective, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, 1994.
[7] C. Carlitz, Distribution of primitive roots in a finite field, Quarterly Journal of Math-
ematics, vol. 4, pp. 4-10, 1953.
[8] T. W. Cusick, C. Ding, A. Renvall, Stream Ciphers and Number Theory, Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 1998
[9] C. Ding, G. Xiao, W. Shan, New measure indexes on the security of stream ciphers,
Proceedings of the Third Chinese National Workshop on Cryptology, Xi’an, China, pp.
5-15, 1988.
[10] C. Ding, G. Xiao, W. Shan, The Stability Theory of Stream Ciphers, Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, 1991.
74
Chapter 4: The k-Error Linear Complexity 75
[11] L. J. Garcia-Villalba and A. Fu´ster-Sabater, On the linear complexity of the sequences
generated by nonlinear filterings, Information Processing Letters, vol. 76, no. 1-2, pp.
67-73, 2000.
[12] M. R. Garey and D.S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability, W.H. Freeman, New
York, 1979.
[13] S. M. Jennings, Multiplexed sequences: some properties of the minimum polynomial,
Proceedings Workshop on Cryptography, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, LNCS vol. 149, pp.
189-206, 1983.
[14] S. M. Jennings, Autocorrelation function of the multiplexed sequences, IEEE Proceed-
ings, vol. 131, no. 2, pp. 169-172, 1984.
[15] A. N. Kolmogorov, Three approaches to the quantitative definition of information,
Problems Information Transmission, vol. 1, pp. 1-7, 1965.
[16] S. Konyagin, T. Lange, and I. E. Shparlinski, Linear complexity of the discrete loga-
rithm, Designs Codes Cryptography, vol. 28, pp. 135-146, 2003.
[17] A. Lempel, J. Ziv, On the complexity of finite sequences, IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 75-81, 1976.
[18] R. Lidl, H. Niederreiter, Introduction to Finite Fields and Their Applications, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
[19] P. Martin-Lo¨f, The definition of random sequences, Information and Control, vol. 9,
pp. 602-619, 1966.
[20] J. L. Massey, Shift-register synthesis and BCH decoding, IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Theory, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 122-127, 1969.
[21] W. Meidl, Enumeration results on linear complexity profiles and lattice profiles, Jour-
nal of Complexity, vol. 22, pp. 275-286, 2006.
[22] W. Meidl and H. Niederreiter, Linear complexity, k-error linear complexity, and the
discrete Fourier transform, Journal of Complexity, vol. 18, pp. 87-103, 2002.
[23] W. Meidl and H. Niederreiter, Counting functions and expected values for the k-error
linear complexity, Finite Fields Applications, vol. 8, pp. 142-154, 2002.
Chapter 4: The k-Error Linear Complexity 76
[24] W. Meidl and H. Niederreiter, On the expected value of the linear complexity and the
k-error linear complexity of periodic sequences, IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 48, pp. 2817-2825, 2002.
[25] W. Meidl and A. Winterhof, Lower bounds on the linear complexity of the discrete
logarithm in finite fields, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 47, pp.
2807-2811, 2001.
[26] H. Niederreiter, Sequences with almost perfect linear complexity profile, Advances in
Cryptology - EUROCRYPT’ 87: Workshop on the Theory and Application of Crypto-
graphic Techniques, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, April 1987. Proceedings, Springer,
Berlin, LNCS vol. 304, pp. 37-51, 1988.
[27] H. Niederreiter, Some computable complexity measures for binary sequences, Se-
quences and Their Applications (C. Ding, T. Helleseth, and H. Niederreiter, eds.),
pp. 67-78, Springer, London, 1999.
[28] H. Niederreiter, C. P. Xing, Rational Points on Curves over Finite Fields, Theory
and Applications, London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series 285, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
[29] D. Redmond, Number Theory, An Introduction, Marcel Dekker, New York, 1996.
[30] K. H. Rosen, Elementary Number Theory and Its Applications, Addison-Wesley Pub-
lishing Company, Reading, Massachusetts, 1984.
[31] R. A. Rueppel, Correlation immunity and the summation combiners, Advances in
Cryptology: Proceeding Cryptography 85, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 260-272, 1986.
[32] R. A. Rueppel, Analysis and Design of Stream Ciphers, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1986.
[33] A. Shamir, Stream cipher: dead or alive, Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT
2004: 10th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology
and Information Security, Jeju Island, Korea, Springer, Berlin, p. 78, 2004.
[34] D. Shanks, Solved and Unsolved Problems in Number Theory, Chelsea Publishing
Company, New York, 1985.
[35] C. E. Shannon, The mathematical theory of communication, The Bell System Tech-
nical Journal, vol. 27, pp. 379-423, 1948.
Chapter 4: The k-Error Linear Complexity 77
[36] C. E. Shannon, Communication theory of secrecy systems, The Bell System Technical
Journal, vol. 28, pp. 656-715, 1949.
[37] V. Shoup, Searching for primitive roots in finite fields, Mathematics of Computation,
vol. 58, pp. 369-380, 1992.
[38] I. E. Shparlinski, Number Theoretic Methods in Cryptography: Complexity Lower
Bounds, Birkha¨user, Basel, 1999.
[39] I. E. Shparlinski, Cryptographic Applications of Analytic Number Theory: Complexity
Lower Bounds and Pseudorandomness, Birkha¨user, Basel, 2003.
[40] G. J. Simmons, Contemporary Cryptology, The Science of Information Integrity, IEEE
Press, Piscataway, 1992.
[41] R. J. Solomonov, A formal theory of inductive inference, Part I, Information and
Control, vol. 7, pp. 1-22, 1964.
[42] C. H. Tan, Period and linear complexity of cascaded clock-controlled generators, Se-
quences and Their Applications (C. Ding, T. Helleseth, and H. Niederreiter, eds.), pp.
371-378, Springer, London, 1999.
Appendix: The Maple Program of
the Berlekamp-Massey Algorithm
% Input s is the sequence;
% N is its length;
% P is the number of elements in the underlying field;
% x is a formal symbol.
% The returning value of function ‘BM’ is the linear complexity of s.
% The file is saved as ‘BMA’ in the working space of Maple.
BM := proc(s,N, P, x)
local C, B, T, L, k, i, n, d, b, safemod;
safemod := (exp, P ) − > ‘if’(P=0, exp, exp mod P );
B := 1; C := 1; L := 0;
k := 1; b := 1;
for n from 0 to N − 1 do
d := s[n+ 1];
for i from 1 to L do
d := safemod(d + coeff(C, xi) ∗ s[n− i+ 1], P );
od;
if d=0 then k := k + 1 fi;
if (d <> 0 and 2 ∗ L > n) then
C := safemod(expand(C − d ∗ xk ∗B/b), P );
k := k + 1;
fi;
if (d <> 0 and 2 ∗ L <= n) then
T := C;
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C := safemod(expand(C − d ∗ xk ∗B/b), P );
B := T ;
L := n+ 1− L;
k := 1;
b := d;
fi;
od;
return C;
save BM, BMA;
